

# DOCTRINE

General Military Review

# 06

## DOCTRINE

The Commitment of Land Forces in Operations

## FOREIGN STUDIES

The Role of the United States Army in Homeland Security

## FREEDOM OF SPEECH

The Employment Policy of Armed Forces within the Framework of Protection

# LAND FORCES CONTRIBUTION TO PUBLIC SECURITY/LAW AND ORDER DURING EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL OPERATIONS



>> Lessons Learned

LO (Law & Order) and PSO (Peace Support Operations)



# Summary # 06

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C.D.E.F



Whatever the angle from which we look into the nature of wars of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we have no choice but to acknowledge that the conduct of operations towards victory will be of a joint nature or will just not exist.

The Joint nature of warfare, as far as logistic support of forces, communications assets, global intelligence and general command and control are concerned, is now a reality. This reality is even more evident when we consider the maneuver of fires: from the air, the sea, soon probably from space, and as of yet, still from the ground.

This implies two conditions for land forces. The first one consists in the requirement for a joint contribution adapted for and integrated into all operations. This means optimal coordination and interoperability with other services. The second, and essential one, pertains to the specificity of land forces - the only force able to win and materialize the politico-military objectives of all our deployments - i.e. the establishment or re-establishment of a durable peace - the only force indeed, as this peace can only be achieved as it concerns populations who do not leave at sea, nor in the air, but firmly on the ground.

In this respect, although at the strategic and operational levels, it is unquestionable that the air and/or sea components can conduct determining operations (embargos, destruction of forces, attrition and even neutralization of industrial capacities), one must consider the ability of the land component capable of carrying out decisive actions not only at the strategic and operational levels, but also at the tactical level.

In fact, the adaptability, agility and flexibility of land forces guarantee compliance with the three principles that characterize present conflicts on a permanent basis; legitimacy of actions, gradation of effects, and collateral damage avoidance.

As such, the Army is the only force able to inscribe its operations over the longer term - the latter is necessary for men and their history - in order to exercise direct influence over populations with discernment, a permanent concern for reversibility, understanding, and the ability to apply the proper amount of force. All of this within the framework of a wide multidisciplinary spectrum combining cultural, social, financial, economical, ecological and humanitarian aspects with military requirements.

Therefore, if only the land component has these essential capabilities, then they must be enhanced in order to better fulfill the strategic expectations of the political power. Taking into account the nature of the conflicts of this century - for which the end-state objectives often pertain less to conquest than to a conversion to democratic principles and pacification - it has now become obvious to the international public opinion that being reluctant to commit oneself on the ground, without real commitment toward the populations who are the only real victims and stakes of today's wars, is equivalent to nothing else but putting oneself on display.

**Major General Gérard BEZACIER,  
Commander Doctrine for Force  
Employment Center**

# The Commitment of Land Forces in Operations

In the beginning of this year 2005, it is suitable to draw conclusions: 2004, was an intense year for French land forces, both in the homeland and overseas: Haiti in February, Kosovo in March, 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration for the Normandy landings and first riots in the Ivory Coast in June, then Bouaké and Abidjan in November, Afghanistan and the "VIGIPIRATE" plan as a "recurrent theme"...

**The common feature for all these events was the commitment of land forces alongside other armed forces to assist LO (Law and Order) enforcement, in France or overseas,** in close cooperation with police forces. Either to protect our fellow-citizens, meet their expectations, evacuate them or preserve peace within their environment, land forces are committed according to specific criteria that should be clearly explained.

- Even if some militaries have forgotten it, because of the increased number of overseas operations, **the defense of home territory and the protection of our population -wherever it lives - remain a top priority for the armed forces and in particular for land forces,** as these populations do not live in the air or on the sea.
- **Land forces can operate on home territory but only in exceptional circumstances,** for a basic reason linked to the democratic nature of our Republic. For technical and legal reasons that can easily be understood, an airman is responsible for air defense and a seaman tasked for carrying out coastal police along our borders. But there is no "current" legitimacy for a soldier to be a LO representative, in particular on homeland territory. Police forces carry out this duty, receiving orders from civilian authorities; and only in unusual circumstances (such as a terrorist threat, an exceptional and serious urgency) a force should intervene in camouflaged battle-dress and under military command, according to very restrictive rules.
- In these exceptional circumstances, corresponding to a specific arrangement in the ordinance of 1959 (we'll come back to it) **land forces are then committed as an additional force, and not to replace police forces:** with specific command and control and COAs (Courses of Action) under the orders of a military commander, to conduct self-contained operations. Then, the Army's specific capabilities gain in importance, all the more as "land" know-how and expertise, provide them with a major role to safeguard France and the French people.

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BY MAJOR GENERAL GÉRARD BEZACIER, COMMANDER DOCTRINE FOR FORCES EMPLOYMENT CENTER

Land forces' specific capabilities and assets, sophisticated commitment environments, decrease of resources to meet requirements, all contribute to specify and improve<sup>1</sup> the Army's specific capabilities and ROEs (Rules of Engagement) on homeland territory when facing hazards and threats.

Indeed, even if aiding in LO operations, especially on homeland territory, is currently an exceptional mission for the armed forces (as it is not a standing mission) it has become a major mission for it over the years.

LO (Law and Order) "includes all the rules and services aimed at protecting individuals. It is considered as a general police mission and it globally consists of protecting people and assets". **On homeland territory**, it aids in carrying out protection (defined as "all protective postures within the framework of the defense of homeland territory in order to enforce public peace, i.e. institutions, government services, economic activity operating normally, protecting people, facilities and public buildings, as well as carrying out LO operations". See joint glossary.

## Which Hazards and Threats and within which Environment ?


**The environment of overseas theaters** is well known because similar and yet very different situations are daily encountered by committed land forces: crowd control<sup>2</sup>, coordinating with French gendarmes - but also with foreign forces - to plan and carry out operations, within the framework of multinational coalitions; but also coordinating **with local or international police forces** - currently being set up or reconstituted - **carrying out LO operations** alongside them to support them, to give them credibility or to deploy them after a commitment phase... There are very different situations but one single reaction has to be safeguarded from now on: the ever closer cooperation of soldiers and gendarmes, so much our specific national feature is an advantage to meet the threats encountered in Mitrovica or Abidjan; but especially to carry out stabilization operations properly by shifting from a military command and control to a civilian control - a shift that is perfectly symbolized by the gendarmerie - both a military and police force.

**In front of us**, in first echelon: agitators manipulating excited and consenting or manipulated crowds, subversive groups carrying out guerilla warfare, disinformation warfare or specific attacks. In second echelon, more inconspicuous individuals or structures - terrorists or dealers - endeavoring to carry out more diffuse, more continuous and less

visible operations, except for striking more radically and more brutally and generally more specifically.

In a first phase, all these threats aim to outflank, to weaken and to undermine the credibility of allied operations - and first of all of police operations - if possible in front of the media's cameras in order to ruin all the efforts carried out to relaunch the political, economic and social life of the troubled country. In order to avoid destabilization or the appearance of anarchy - even temporary and localized, the commitment of the deployed force is then necessary to rapidly establish a state of calm after the chaos which is likely to ensue: Haiti or Kosovo are two examples for this spiral of violence that has become commonplace when being committed.

However, a major armed confrontation, **on homeland territory**, has been discredited since the late 80s and the armed forces' enemy is not located within national borders. Yet, **terrorist threats** are still there, as well as **potential insurrectionary situations** that are likely not to be swept with the back of our hand: in these conditions, we see that armed forces - in particular land forces - will be able to provide police forces with an essential tool: a few examples of actual or potential hazards to shed light on these issues: Rennes street, Châtelet: limited bomb attacks, not requiring sealing-off, medical or environment assets other than those normally allotted to such disasters, either natural or



non-natural ones. But the 03/11 bomb attack in Madrid (nearly 1 000 casualties), a “dirty” bomb, the release of a gas bottle or bioterrorism, all these threats - so credible that Mr. de VILLEPIN recently made a proposal on the international scene - require such extensive responses that **the Army is undoubtedly called upon, in a very logical way owing to its specific features, as regards C2 (Command and Control), reactivity, CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) characteristics or others !** And these players, unable to face us directly because of our technological advantages, will then manage to cause the armed forces to get committed on homeland territory in an indirect way that they will always favor to influence our government or punish our population.

## Army's Strong Points

**The Army is an essential police forces' partner,** obviously with some adaptation, in homeland territory commitment, as it knows and masters the air-land environment, because of its specific capabilities and its COAs, as well as its capability to operate within civilian populations.

**Overseas, the Army is tasked with an essential role,** because of its presence on the terrain, its knowledge of the environment and its protracted contact with populations. This is its natural AOO (Area of Operation), more than the surrounding countryside, desert or mountains, and it masters it, in particular thanks to the knowledge of

local authorities or of public life officials that it takes into account. Thanks to its unrelenting commitments that it has carried out for 15 years, it knows how to adapt itself to rapid changes of situations, to different cultural environments, which differ considerably from one country to the other. Present as early as the early stage of conflicts and always with a wide sustainability experience, knowing how to concentrate its actions - among others to gather intelligence on urbanized terrain - it is accustomed to sudden environment changes and to other abrupt situation changes, in order to prevent incidents or to react to aggressions and to breaches of peace and order.

**As it makes up the bulk of stabilization forces after any commitment,** a phase during which breaches of peace and order are likely to occur, the Army quickly sets up C2 (Command and Control) assets to bring about required synergies with organizations as different as IGOs/NGOs<sup>3</sup>, local warring factions, or joint CS (*Combat Support*) and CSS (*Combat Service Support*) assets. It remains flexible - through its organizations, standing anticipating measures and required assets - to shift from a return-to-normal-life situation to an “interposition-type” - even coercion-type - situation, to suppress troublemakers.

**Overseas as in France,** the presence of soldiers in camouflaged battle-dress deters, but also reassures: they are being committed for this very symbol, which calms concerned

populations. Military patrols in airports, in railroad stations and in the subway, at the bottom of the Eiffel Tower no longer surprise anyone and are perfectly accepted by the population and moreover by police forces. Thus, the French can notice that the Services concretely and directly take part in their protection. Through their attitude, their dress, their activity, their behavior, soldiers are a “media”; they let a clear message get through: they can be kindly but watchful, even threatening. These quick and coordinated changes of posture are as many strong messages.

Seasoned to patrols, to *check-points*, to area control operations - even crowd control<sup>4</sup> operations for infantry units - during overseas operations, Army units are naturally ready to carry out such missions on home territory by adapting themselves to the environment. Its task-organization in companies and PROTERRE TFs (*Task Forces*), tasked to implement a common mission basis - Army Common Missions<sup>5</sup> - make homeland operations easier: Évian or the 60<sup>th</sup> landing anniversary showed the relevance of this concept, which enables to carry out self-contained operations in addition to police forces, with all the units of land forces within overall joint organizations. Thus, in June 2003, the French Army provided most of the troops (1,750 troops out of a total of 2,550 committed troops) protecting the Évian G8 summit.

Above all, more than strength that has become in short supply, the French

Army has invaluable capabilities within this kind of environment. In addition to vital, deployable coordination and C2 capabilities, as well as reconnaissance, and various expertise and anticipation capabilities linked to them, it has an array of very different assets: CBRN defense assets, medical evacuation capabilities, engineer assets (mine clearing, BAC (*Battle Area Clearance*), works, commitment into flooded areas, setting-up and fitting of refugee camps, water treatment, power supply...), transportation in difficult areas, communications, HUMINT (*Human Intelligence*) and SIGINT (*Signal Intelligence*), anti-aircraft protection, etc... Indeed, CPs - especially “level-2 and -3” CPs - are perfectly trained for commitments; and they are able to plan and control unusual situations as they normally do it when they are actually committed. Consequently, they are able to set up “*joint-fitted*” land command CPs - in particular within multinational environments - as it happened for the Nantes Land Command CP during the 60<sup>th</sup> landing anniversary.

## Army's Position and Role

**Within the framework of overseas operations,** after an intervention phase or just a deployment, land forces should create a favorable climate to enable the achievement of the end state. Thanks to their daily operations, **it will be possible to restore LO.** To this end, a force commander could be tasked or not be tasked - in his mandate - to carry out LO



operations. In the first case, he will be responsible for LO in his AOO and he will be supported by a "police" advisor and by a "police" augmentation force. In the other case, a local civilian or international authority will be responsible for LO; he is likely to require support from forces in the theater. However, should serious troubles occur, the forces' commander can decide to restore LO.

## **Within this environment, the Army's role is obvious.**

It will set the necessary conditions to return to peace - conditions enabling police forces to establish LO. Should the situation drift off, it will be able to operate in addition to these forces - or to take over from them - with its own assets and its specific COAs. Indeed, it will take part in stepping up efforts by shifting into high gear if necessary and if deterrence was not enough. Eventually, it can - through its presence and its contact with the population - gather intelligence and anticipate coming events.

## **More specifically, as regards homeland territory, the Army already takes part in protection**

through its units being permanently in a security posture (protection of military facilities, units on alert, prepositioned troops...) and through its units deployed overseas within the framework of global defense. Nevertheless, it can do more by offering specialized services under civilian authorities' command. In case of emergency, the Army can set up units and specific assets better than others can; however some specific rules and limitations should

be set. Above all, its action should take place in a serious and urgent context or when other government services do not have enough assets. Indeed, **the Army cannot and must not do everything; it cannot replace existing and available assets, but it cannot be away when the population requires it - which is its raison d'être.**

The conditions for its commitment must be clear and sufficiently planned. Under civilian authorities' command at the highest level, it should afterwards keep its conventional organization and, under no circumstances, become back-up troops for various

services or organizations.

**As it has an additional role, its end state must be set; it should not be requested to provide strengths and means, but tasked with some effect to achieve for which are then assigned assets and defined COAs by its commanders at various levels,** as it can do for overseas operations. Within the framework of the Joint Territorial Defense Organization, the homeland territory is broken down into defense areas - under the command of flag officers<sup>6</sup> - to which the Army makes its contribution. For coastal and air protection, if the French Navy and the French Air Force

undoubtedly and respectively play a leading role, as it is obvious from a technical and legal point of view, it is also obvious that on homeland territory (i.e. on the terrain) as overseas **and for all these "extraordinary" conditions, the French Army has a leading role within the armed forces.**

**ROEs** should be accurate and clearly understood in order to avoid any incident, while enabling action, if necessary. This is true **for any theater, but among others on the French territory;** as it is very tricky, after having been deployed onto an overseas theater

within a hostile environment, to be back on homeland territory to carry out a protective mission, where hostility could be merged among one's own citizens.

## **Appropriate and clear rules**

should correspond to these various environments. If Army's soldiers can adapt themselves to sophisticated situations that they are likely to face, thanks to their high-level expertise, we have to make their task easier, i.e. give them easy orders ! And then, they are able to operate - fully aware of the situation - and without questioning their initiative capability and their experience: **i.e. not necessarily putting a corporal, with 10 years of service and having served in Mitrovica, Abidjan and elsewhere, under the command of a young**



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**police officer with only a few months' training...** It occurred sometimes; happily, it is no longer true!

Eventually, **let us not forget the other kinds of action for existing land forces within the array of tools available to the government.** First of all, LO operations within which the Army could be committed - under the scheme of “third-category” force requisitioning, by prefectoral authorities.

Afterwards, homeland defense, still in force with decree Nr. 73-235, dated March 1, 1973. Then, it is a matter of meeting a threat on homeland territory by carrying out military operations to intercept and neutralize armed hostile groups. Then, the Army would be in first line to carry out this kind of operation, because it would carry out its conventional COAs. Tasked commanders would then get the required

authorizations to carry out their missions, including the use of weapons. It does not mean a transfer of authority from public authorities to military authorities, which is the ultimate possibility granted in the ordinance of 1959, by the way in a paragraph dealing with prefectoral authority - which can authorize a military commander to command and control a specific operation in a given area.

1 For this purpose, see Colonel Vergez in-process article dealing with joint land security concept.

2 Committing land forces **in overseas operations** to meet hostile or non-hostile players, early considered as non-combatants. Carried out within the framework of tasked missions and ROEs, this commitment aims to meet any individual or collective action to a right standard, requiring self-protection measures, operations in direct contact with crowds, even operations on urbanized terrain. It takes place at any stage of a crisis, most often but not exclusively during

stabilization phases, when local - police or legal - organizations are lacking, poor or failing (see the commitment of land forces for crowd control Nr. 426/EMATBCSF/CTC, dated 05/24/04).

3 IGOs/NGOs : International Intergovernmental Organizations/Non-Governmental Organizations  
4 To be clearly set apart from **LO operations**, carried out on homeland territory within the framework of requisitioning.  
5 Army Common Missions.  
6 Defense Area Flag Officer.  
7 From now on, the Army is considered as carrying out the most important role for our defense. Thus, the people polled were asked to sort out the different Services in order of priority, according to their importance within our defense system; for the second year in row, they give the top priority to the Army (**39%**, 36% in 2003, 36% in 2002, 29% in 2001) before the Air Force (**33%**, 33% in 2003, 36% in 2002, 42% in 2001), the Gendarmerie (**13%**, 11% in 2003, 11% in 2002, 11% in 2001) and the Navy (**10%**, 14% in 2003, 12% in 2002, 12% in 2001) - extract from the opinion survey “the picture of the Services”, 2004.

**Everyday, the Army takes part in LO operations, either in overseas theaters or on home territory;** both kinds of operations being closely linked to each other. Its major role should be neither forgotten nor reduced. It has capabilities; it should exploit them, make them known and get ready for any kind of commitment, in particular on home territory. Hazards are pending and the Army should get ready for them! **The French trust it**, as shown by various opinion surveys<sup>7</sup> that take place every year. **More than any other Service, the Army is their armed force** through its closeness, its human aspect, its presence on the whole of the territory. They are aware of the fact that they can rely on it, should floods, oil slicks, forest fires occur, and similarly, they will expect it to be there in tragic situations.

Yet, cooperating with police forces is essential, as an interagency operation on homeland territory or with (inter)national organizations on overseas theatres; but everyone should know its place and above all, it should never hide the important role carried out by land forces.

Furthermore, **the increasing commitment of the French forces for protecting homeland territory** can no longer be considered **within the sole national framework**, but **training and command and control should be carried out within a European, transatlantic - and, if necessary international - framework**, as for defending oneself against a conventional enemy.

## Note from the publication directorate

From now on, the term “**homeland missions**” replaces “**interior operations**”. However, owing to printing deadlines, this amendment was not taken into account for this issue.



## Texts Pertaining to Land Forces within the Framework of Public Security

- Ordinance Nr. 59-147 of 01/07/1959 - Defense General Organization.
- Decree Nr. 62-808 of July 18, 1962 - Defense General Organization.
- Decree Nr. 64-11 of January 3, 1964 - Organization for Territorial Defense Responsibilities within French Overseas Territories.
- Decree Nr. 73-235 of March 1, 1973 - Homeland Defense.
- Decree Nr. 73-236 of March 1, 1973 - Security areas of Critical Infrastructure Facilities.
- Decree Nr. 86-1231 of 12/02/1986 - Defense Operational Centers.
- Decree Nr. 88-622 of May 6, 1988 - Emergency Plan.
- Decree Nr. 95-573 of May 2, 1995 - Crowd Dispersal.
- Ministerial Directive Nr. 500/SGDN/MPS/OTP of May 9, 1995 - Commitment of Armed Forces for Law and Order enforcement.
- Decree Nr 95-523 of May 3, 1995 - Appointment and Authority of Regional Defense Areas Delegates and their Counterparts.
- Joint directive Nr. 00519/DEF/EMA/EMP.3/NP of 05/12/1998 - ROEs and Rules of Behavior for Land Defense.
- Decree Nr. 2000-555 of June 21, 2000 - Defense Territorial Organization.
- By-law of June 28, 2000 - Joint Territorial Defense Organization.
- Memorandum, CIMIC (Civilian-Military Cooperation) and Crisis Management; November 2000 edition.
- Directive Nr. 000674/DEF/EMA/EMP.4/NP of 07/03/2001 - Joint Standing Command and Control Organization for other than Continental France.
- MOU (Memorandum of Understanding between the MOD and Interior Minister - Availability of CBRN assets for Emergency Aid to Populations on Homeland Territory, dated 10/22/2001.
- Provisional Directive Nr. 496/DEF/EMA/EMP.1/NP, June 12, 2002 - Armed Forces Contribution to Public Security missions within the framework of PSOs (Peace-Support Operations).
- Government Security Program against Terrorist Threats "Operation VIGIPIRATE", March 2003 edition.
- Specialized Programs against Terrorist Threats, March 2003 edition:
  - Operation PIRATOX (chemical).
  - Operation BIOTOX (biological).
  - Operation PIRATOME (nuclear and radiological).
  - Operation PIRANET (attacks against ADP systems).
- Study, Land Protection Concept (Note Nr. 5/DEF/EMAT/BPO/EO/10 of January 5, 2004).
- Joint Doctrine on overseas ROE's: ROE's and Rules of Behavior (PIA Nr. 05-203).
- FM 950: Use of Land Forces for Crowd Control on an Overseas Theater of Operations (2004 edition).

*In overseas operations, the terrorist risks, specifically NRBC, have been taken into account by our forces for a long time, among other reasons because of the existence of dangers linked to the industrial and technological environment. The article below more specifically addresses the potential risks across the national territory.*

## The Potential Risks Across the National Territory, Against which the Army Might Be Committed: the International Terrorist Threat

BY MAJOR GENERAL JEAN-PIERRE MEYER, HEAD OF THE PERMANENT SECRETARY TO THE INTELLIGENCE INTER-MINISTRY COMMITTEE (SGDN)

### The End of “Sanctuaries”

For several years, the territories of several European States, especially the United Kingdom and Spain, played the role of rear bases, dedicated to the logistics of offensive Islamic groups, mostly operating in other countries. The “sanctuarization” of certain areas could ensue from the relatively centralized organization of the networks linked with *al-Qaida*, at a moment when a great deal of terrorist actions were directly planned or authorized by the leaders of the Islamic nebula, from the Pakistan-Afghan area.

Later, **the noticeable setback of the influence and command capabilities of the central nucleus of *al-Qaida*, a direct consequence of the blows which had**



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**struck it**, especially thanks to the operations conducted by the coalition in Afghanistan and in the North of Pakistan, **has led to an increasing autonomy of terrorist cells.** These cells, for which the *al-Qaida*

management team provides at least the ideological framework and certainly keeps an impulsion role, have from that moment seemed to act from their own initiative, generally where they were rooted.

The bloody attacks perpetrated in Saudi Arabia<sup>1</sup> and later in Turkey<sup>2</sup>, in the course of 2003, marked the beginning of this trend. In turn, the thwarted large action attempts, notably in France, in the United

Kingdom or in Germany, since September 2002, and then the attacks in Madrid, in March 2004, have confirmed that the previous European sanctuaries were now listed among the targets of Islamic terrorists.

More recent events, such as the assassination of the Dutch moviemaker Theo Van Gogh on November 2, 2004, indicate that **Europe as a whole is now the privileged ground of action** for cells or networks. Some of these have demonstrated, especially in France, their ability to rapidly switch from a support role to an offensive activity, on the same territory. In this way, and taking into account the lack of need for rear logistical bases, it cannot be excluded that the Madrid scenario could reproduce itself in any European Union State and, possibly, on the national territory.

## A Recognized Threat Against France

The significant size of the Islamic breeding ground and the increased activity of networks on our land are no longer a secret to anyone, especially as far as the ex-mujaheddins from Afghanistan, Bosnia and Chechnya and very possibly, in the medium term, from Iraq are concerned. As in the rest of Europe, **the threat comes from smaller and**

**smaller cells, only related with individual connections** whose members try to integrate into society, even without demonstrating a religious attendance.

France has been directly threatened several times, during these last months, by Islamic networks prominent leaders. In their eyes, there is no lack of pretexts to include our country amongst the "global Jihad" targets (in particular, distorted apprehension of the national debate about secularism, and condemnation of our military engagement in Afghanistan). However, these pretexts inadequately reflect the real bases of a more and more undifferentiated threat against all Western States, which, in any case, places France in the first circle of targeted States. In fact, the genuineness of these declarations, giving sometimes root for controversies, is less important than the very true echo they meet (one of them attributed to the number 2 of *al-Qaida*, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and broadcasted on October 1 2004, called explicitly and without ambiguity to strike French interests) and **it cannot be excluded that one or another of these calls will eventually incite some militants to switch to action.**

## The Non-Conventional Terrorist Threat: a Reality

The sarin attack perpetrated on March 20, 1995 in the Tokyo metro by the Aum Shirinkyo sect (12 dead and over 5 000 harmed) opened the era of the chemical terrorist threat ten years ago. Later, the dispersion of anthrax spores, which killed five persons in the United States in the fall of 2001, has shown that even biological terrorism is now a reality.

Facing a non-conventional threat, which is now tangible, there is no longer time for discussions about the rudimentary nature of terrorists' capabilities. The dismantling in December 2002 of networks planning to use ricin in the United Kingdom and cyanide gases in France<sup>3</sup>, should be sufficient to remove the last hesitations.

No part of this threat must be neglected. First, the efficiency of chemical toxins, as well as their relative ease of production and implementation turn them into means privileged by terrorists and, very likely, by Islamic activists. In addition, the coalition operations in Afghanistan have verified that *al-Qaida* had carried out relatively advanced research in the **biological field**. Although the use of agents of this type remains very touchy and is not part of the short term threats, the

American *National Intelligence Council* (NIC), in its "*Mapping the Global Future*" report, published last January, reckons as very credible the possibility that terrorists organizations linked to *al-Qaida*, or their "heirs" might conduct attacks using agents such as anthrax or small pox bacillus against the United States or other "enemy" States in the coming 15 years. Last, although some experts agree to recognize that Islamic terrorists do not have - or do not yet have - the capability to manufacture, steal or use a nuclear weapon, all of them emphasize risks linked to the manufacturing easiness and to the effects of a radiological dispersion weapon, of a "dirty bomb" type, even of a small size.

- 1 Two attacks targeted against compounds (residential complexes for foreigners) in Riyadh killed 35 persons, on May 12 2003, and another 18, on November 9. Since then, particularly bloody attacks have taken place in Saudi Arabia.
- 2 At Istanbul, attacks stroke two synagogues on November 15 2003, then the British General Consulate and the local main office of the HSBC bank on November 20. In total, they killed over 50 persons.
- 3 This was the cell called "Romainville", partly composed of previous French mujaheddins engaged in Chechnya.

**This assessment may seem alarmist.** Indeed, the identified operational modes of the networks connected with *al-Qaida* seem to favor massive attacks using explosives which are the only ones enabling, with the use of "rustic" assets, to generate heavy tolls and the sight, widely mediatized, of destructions and massacres that will very likely frighten western populations. **It still remains that the technical advances of Islamic activists are rapid**, especially thanks to the dissemination of knowledge through the Internet, and it is now recognized that they can manage to obtain and master valid protocols for the manufacture and use of powerful chemical and bacteriological agents.



# A Draft Concept for Joint Territorial Safeguard Operations

Since there is a permanent risk for a crisis to pop up on our national territory and its approaches, as well as abroad against our nationals, there is a **definite need to envisage a wider framework for the actions of our forces in order to enable them to provide an appropriate response without taking them off their usual defense and security missions**. The increased vulnerability of our societies whose citizens are becoming more and more demanding regarding their security, implies that the authorities bring a reassuring and significant response to any exceptional event that could occur in the life of the nation. In such a context, it is obvious that the armed forces must contribute in a way that must be clearly defined. This is the objective of the studies that are being developed on the **“territorial safeguard operations”** concept.

BY COLONEL JEAN-LOUIS VERGEZ, BUREAU EMA/EMPLOI

Although within the framework of air and maritime safeguard operations, the armed forces assume responsibilities that are clearly defined by series of rules, it is quite different when dealing with territorial land operations. In this domain, **the armed forces do not assume any responsibility over the national territory, except for what regards the immediate**

**protection of their own facilities<sup>1</sup>**. Their presence is only and must only be circumstantial. The responsibility for the safety of the territory and the populations belongs, in all circumstances, to the civilian authorities which unsurprisingly call upon civilian (civil protection, firemen...) and general safety organizations (police forces gendarmerie...). However, it

must be noticed that **the armed forces thanks to their capabilities and know-how, are more and more often required to participate** in contingency operations. After having defined a maritime posture of safeguard intended to optimize the employment of military maritime assets to cover the entire spectrum of operations at sea (including both the actions of

governmental administrations and those specifically military), the armed forces must conduct a reflexion whose objective will be to **define a territorial posture of safeguard<sup>2</sup> which could be used as a framework of reference for any armed forces' engagement on the national territory**.

This posture of territorial safeguard must be understood as

including any **participation of the armed forces in response to civil defense, civil safety and general safety requirements**. Depending on the circumstances and the priorities defined by the civilian authorities, this posture may include, the participation of the armed forces in missions of :

- Support to prevention actions,
- Direct support to distressed populations,
- Support to public services,
- General security, among which are missions related to anti-terrorism (Vigipirate and Pirate plans).

Even if all armed forces are involved in the missions relevant to territorial safeguard, it is obvious that it is **the Army that should hold a very specific role within that posture** because of the diversity of the capabilities it holds, maintains and implements.



## General Framework of the Territorial Safeguard

Defense has been defined as global by the 1959 ordinance. This basic principle has been consolidated, even amplified. Moreover, the continuity of the actions, from those carried out outside the territory to those conducted on the national territory, as well as the continuity between purely military defense and general safety actions - which are more specifically relevant to the competence of the police forces - plead for a less partitioned **approach of the concepts governing defense and safety**.

Within this context, one must notice that the mutation of the military tool, now holding more professional know how but with a reduced format, requires an optimization of its employment thanks to greater engagement coherence and the search for more efficiency on the ground.

In any event, **the armed forces remain the “ultima ratio regum”**, the last recourse for the government. It is thus important to **define a strategy of employment of the military assets in order to respond to the political decision maker's expectations and enabling all the strategic choices that will have to be taken into consideration before choosing the assets and the modus operandi to be put into action**. They result of the confrontation of the following criteria of analysis:

- military action justified by a request from the civilian authorities (expressed as a formal requisition or as a request for assistance),

- limited by well defined space-time framework and an appropriate legal framework,
- intervention to respond to an exceptionally grave situation, dictated by an emergency or when civilian assets prove to be nonexistent, inadequate, insufficient or unavailable,
- circumstantial and well targeted participation, with a strictly limited volume of forces, to supplement of existing civilian assets,
- engagement as a full member of the operation, under the command and control of a designated military authority and under the responsibility of a local relevant civilian authority,
- maintain a balance between the military assets to be assigned to exterior operations and those to be dedicated to territorial operations while keeping available those assets necessary on a “permanent protection basis”<sup>3</sup>.

**The territorial posture of safeguard's only purpose is thus to appropriately organize all the efforts required from the armed forces** while keeping in mind the following three principles:

- *Concentration of the efforts* by applying adequate means against the major vulnerabilities identified in relation with risks and/or threats while avoiding freezing the dispositions,
- *Economy of the means*, not responding to requests for assets but rather to requests for effect, and according to the principle of strict sufficiency<sup>4</sup>,
- *Freedom of action*, by guaranteeing the government the capacity

to react in a way proportional to the desired effect; the governmental authorities being advised for that matter by the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, which is the operational commander of any military organization deployed in an OPEX or an OPINT<sup>5</sup>, preserving thus at all times the control of operational resource's employment.

The territorial safeguard posture doesn't aim at eradicating a designated enemy but rather at task **organizing armed forces' contribution to all actions that could have to be conducted in the following continuous spectrum: European France<sup>6</sup>, French overseas territories, foreign territories**. These actions enable us to face simultaneously or successively natural, technological, and environmental risks, illegal trafficking, illegal immigration, proliferation, terrorism while ensuring protection of populations and activities on the national territory (European and Overseas France) as well as the protection of our nationals (expatriated) and our interests abroad. In that case, it is more a question of **detering, monitoring and controlling**.

The action of the armed forces which is decided, initiated and then conducted by the governmental authorities, is dimensioned to meet a precise requirement in terms of effects to be achieved within a limited space-time framework; it is also **integrated within an interministerial security organization**.


## Specific Role of the Army within the “Territorial Safeguard” Concept

The armed forces share competences and know how in matters of:

- Assistance to populations: medical evacuations, peoples' evacuation, water sanitation, electrical power production, telecommunications, support to road traffic, peoples' reception and accommodation, ...
- Services to mitigate the effects of public services dysfunctions: ground organization, roads opening, etc...
- Specific expertise: miscellaneous technical expertise, reconnaissance, planning and conduct of operations.
- Reinforcements of the dispositions dedicated to general security along with other security assets: circumstantial protection of particularly sensitive facilities, stricter control of the land environment, monitoring of borders and specific points of passage, surveillance of land lines of communication, safeguard of the freedom of circulation, protection of particularly sensitive freight transportation or people movements, collection of intelligence to the benefit of all relevant services, encircling of specific areas in support of police forces.

Although territorial safeguard should not be an Army-only specificity, it is however **the Army** that had first been designed to face a major threat on our borders with specific know-how primarily adapted to ground combat operations<sup>7</sup>, it is the Army which **is able from now on to operate on a much**

## Posture of safeguard



**wider scope of operational** situations ranging from coercion engagement to actions relevant to mastering of the violence which all fall very well in the spectrum covered by the concept of territorial safeguard. In this type of engagement, the Army demonstrates its **ability to deter thanks to its active presence, to monitor crowded areas, to control specific points or areas often located in urban environments characterized by their density and complexity.**

The equipment, know-how, and developed courses of action must thus cover all operational situations. The reduction of the forces' format doesn't plead in favor of a role specialization of the units. All Army forces can be employed in missions relevant to the territorial safeguard posture.

**In addition, only the Army is able to provide capabilities for planning and conducting complex ground operations. It holds also a definite expertise for what regards the management of crises,** including those which include the employment of NRBC Weapons of Mass Destruction, combining the employment of significant assets provided by other services, including

potentially several civilian administrations. In order to do so, the Army has at its disposal Forces Headquarters (EMF), as well as specialized units. The security operations undertaken for protecting the Evian summit in June 2003 as well as those that took place for the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Normandy operations in June 2004 have been, in that respect, a success recognized by all civilian and military participants. During those events, the Army provided capabilities for ensuring the tactical control of deployed land units, for supporting general security operations, and supporting as well environment control operations (especially in mountainous areas), for ensuring very diverse types of logistical support (including movement and transportation).

## As a Conclusion

The principles which govern the territorial posture of safeguard aim at providing a framework for the ground engagement of the armed forces in operations intended to protect the populations and to preserve the freedom of action of governmental authorities. They provide an

overall **coherence to any intervention by putting the envisaged actions within an interministerial or, if necessary, a European perspective.** It aims also at **optimizing the role of any engaged military unit.** This engagement is not quantitative or in a back-up role but rather qualitative and active, without taking charge however of those responsibilities which belong to the civilian authorities and these attributions relevant to other governmental services. The diversity of the armed forces capabilities, in particular those held by the Army, their ability to respond efficiently and rapidly to a request, as well as the high degree of qualification of the personnel permitted the mutation that transformed what was previously a request for provision of assets into a request for the provision of services and effects to be achieved.

From now on, the armed forces are able to **provide a wide spectrum of specific know-how whose efficiency on the ground will only be achieved by the implementation of courses of action that they are the only one capable of mastering.**

This is why they must demonstrate their proactivity in front of the civilian authorities during the phases of planning and development of the actions to be conducted. **It is undeniable that the Army plays a major and determining role for all what relates to territorial safeguard.**

This fact is illustrated by the recent evolution of the contribution of the Army to the antiterrorist Vigipirate organization.

In order to do so, **it is necessary to rely on the Joint Territorial Defense**

**Organization (OTIAD),** which plays a major role and guarantees the quality of the relationship between civilian and military authorities. This joint chain of command, which has an operational vocation, is determining for what regards making aware, informing and, especially, advising the corresponding civilian authorities. The actions of the general officers in charge of zones of defense (OGZD), the overseas higher commanders (COMSUP), and the departmental military representatives (DMD) are essential to render comprehensible and acceptable the change of nature of the engagement of the armed forces on the national territory.

1 Armed forces can also participate to territorial defense in exceptional circumstances within the well legally defined framework of the "operational defense of the national territory".

2 Safeguard: all the provisions ensuring protection and guarantee (to persons, freedom, and rights) granted by an authority or provided by an institution.

3 The "permanent protection basis" is intended to meet the requirements of the permanent posture of security as defined by the VIGIPIRATE plan. It regroups all the military assets necessary to ensure:

- Security of military facilities,
- Intervention,
- National alerts activation,
- Aerial security,
- Maritime approaches security,
- Prevention outside continental France,
- CIMIC activities,
- Setting up of NRBC protection organization.

This basis for protection permanently requires 27,000 personnels. The requirement can reach up to 37,000 when the VIGIPIRATE level raises to the upper level of alert.

4 Not to assign more assets than those absolutely indispensable to achieve the desired effect

5 External operation, Internal operation.

6 "European France" refers to continental France including, of course, all French islands located in Europe (Corsica, and others located in the immediate vicinity of continental France).

7 Note: In this respect one must notice that, by nature, Navy and Air Force participations can only be very limited: 1500 navy commandos and about 5000 air commandos.



# The Joint Territorial Defense Organization

The joint territorial defense organization (OTIAD<sup>1</sup>) coordinates the civilian and military efforts in **matter of defense** within a common geographic framework, the national territory divided into “land territorial defense districts”.

This organization was set up in the year 2000, with the enrichment drawn from the lessons learnt during operations carried out on the national territory on the occasion of the 1999 severe wind storm and of the wreck of the Erika ship. This organization is under the authority of the Armed forces Chief of Staff (CEMA).

In each land territorial defense district, at the military level, coordination is carried out:

- in metropolitan France: by a defense district general officer (OGZD<sup>2</sup>) backed by a defense district joint staff (EMIAZD<sup>3</sup>) and represented in departments by a military sub-district representative (DMD<sup>4</sup>);
- in departments and in overseas communities: by a general officer, overseas higher military authority (COMSUP), he is the general officer commanding the defense district

**The mission of the defense district general officer (OGZD) or of the overseas higher military authority (COMSUP) applies to four main domains:**


- civil defense;
- operational territorial defense;
- joint services coordination and consultation;
- civil-military cooperation.

BY CAPTAIN [NAVY] NOCQ, JOINT STAFF OF THE LAND TERRITORIAL NORTH-WEST DEFENSE DISTRICT

Ideally in permanence, but at least from the very beginning of any kind of crisis, **this organization cooperates with its civilian counterpart**, from the ministry of Interior to the prefects in the departments through the defense district prefect, which is reinforced with a district defense staff (EMZ).

The matter is **to ensure continuity for the action of the State**, uniqueness of command, permanence of the mission, civil-military cooperation with the resulting synergy, economy and adaptability of the committed assets and of


capabilities, reaction capability, modularity, and finally commitment modes suited to the circumstances. **Our civilian partners when all their means of action are exhausted** call on their military counterparts to get, as and when needed some reinforcement, some help, or some support likely to let them achieve the desired effect. The completion of that effect is the responsibility of the local prefect, until the transition to an operational territorial defense<sup>5</sup> situation. The decision of committing the Armed Forces is centralized and the OGZD, military advisers to the



district prefects, are authorized through a delegation from the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, to

assume operational control and to coordinate the committed military means. The established structures

## TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION 2000



can evaluate best, how the Armed Forces are to be engaged to help the population, in the framework of our know-how and always as reinforcement to our civilian partners.

**There is one exception** that proves the rule, great urgency when human lives are at risk, in that case we are to be fully committed, and the commitment order could be locally issued with concern for immediate effectiveness only. Finally the OGZDs could be requisitioned when civilian authorities need to get the Armed Forces participating in law and order missions or judicial actions.

**The joint territorial defense organization is backed by light structures that can be reinforced with experts from the three services.** The deployments of military means are organized with the same principles as out of area operations (OPEX<sup>6</sup>). The joint territorial defense organization has already been involved in numerous intervention missions, as for floods, technological disasters, and the Euro establishment that proved the reaction capability and the effectiveness of the established and/or projected assets.

Our success being our

undoing, we often have to **deter our partners from an attempt of using our assets when it is not justified by urgency or by lack of civilian means.**

Whatever the nature or the importance of the ongoing crisis, the dialog with our civilian partners could quickly turn passionate. The talks should be initiated as soon as possible at the three anticipated levels.

The quite often, pithy requests from the prefecture to the DMD are usually said "urgent". Through his assistants the prefect tends

"to demand" rather than "to seek for" an Armed Forces' assistance. Most of the time our counterparts have nearly no room for maneuver, they are under pressure:

- reactivity obligation;
- budgetary constraints that makes it necessary to succeed at no cost;
- obligation maintaining law and order.

In such a context resorting to military means could become obvious very soon, it is cheap and quickly available. A clever presentation to DMD will ease a request for reinforcement all the more as because of urgency it could be difficult checking that all departmental resources are already exhausted.

The request is passed on to the defense district. On the second level of dialog, at defense district level, the request is dealt with considering its basic principles according to the existence or not of available means in the defense district or in other departments. When no civilian solution can be identified, the prefectorial


request could be put to the OGZD. The dialog goes on:

- the defense district joint staff deals with the district defense staff;
- the defense district general officer deals with the district prefect only, he is the last protection of the Armed Forces at the district level when the issue could end in some refusal.

That organization regularly shows much efficiency and makes it possible to dismiss some unjustified requests. However when the pressure is very high or when the request looks acceptable, it is forwarded to the Planning and Conduct of Operations Center (CPCO) along with an opinion on appropriateness.

In the "National territory" cell of the Armed Forces General Staff, the topic is dealt with in depth by considering:

- the position of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff
- the previous analyses made on similar requests;
- the advice of the Defense



## JOINT TERRITORIAL DEFENSE CHAIN OF COMMAND

| LEVEL      | STRUCTURES  | MINISTRY OF INTERIOR<br>COUNTERPARTS  |
|------------|---|---|
| NATIONAL   | <b>CPCO</b><br>Planning and conduct<br>of operations Center                                       | <b>CO Beauvau</b><br>National Governmental Operation Centers<br><b>COGIC Asnières</b>     |
| DISTRICT   | <b>OGZD</b><br>Defense District General Officer<br><b>EMIA/ZD</b><br>Defense district joint staff | <b>Préfet de zone</b><br>Defense district prefect<br><b>EMZ</b><br>District defense staff |
| DEPARTMENT | <b>DMD</b><br>Military sub-district<br>representative   | <b>Préfet</b><br>Prefect  |

dialog with the Planning and Conduct of Operations Center at the first alert. If the request is to be agreed we will save time. If it is to be rejected we will increase the probability for us to succeed, more particularly when it is about requests based on poor foundations that can only be rejected at a higher level as we cannot succeed in having them withdrawn or modified at our own level.

- to inform the OGZD quickly so that he gets all necessary elements to make his decision. That is all the more important as there is some external intervention directly aimed at him.
- to tell the prefect what the decision of the Armed Forces General Staff is, and possibly to go on discussing the wording of the request for assistance.

Secretary's personal staff;  
- the availability of our assets.

Even for very modest subjects, the decision making process could be polluted by:

- prefects that do not give up and make use of their Parisian relationship, and so doing, trigger off an interdepartmental dialog;
- political interventions;
- the use of the most powerful prefectorial tool: requisition.

It appears clearly that, if the

vocation of the joint territorial defense organization is to achieve what has to be, it also has to reject or to let the Planning and Conduct of Operations Center in a position to do so when it has sufficient time left to succeed.

**So we must :**

- **act very quickly when it is necessary to immediately react to assist our fellow-countrymen;**
- **preserve the Armed Forces interest;**
- **keep going the civil-**

**military dialog even when our choice is to turn down a request for assistance.**

To provide the best support (we understand the nature of the difficulties met by DMD and how, at times, their mission could appear difficult and unrewarding) military sub-district representatives should keep in contact with the prefecture when some event is being prepared in order to:

- to initiate the decision cycle before the receipt of a formal request as much as possible, to establish the

1 Translator's note: Organisation Territoriale Interarmées de Défense (OTIAD).

2 Translator's note: Officier Général de Zone de Défense (OGZD.)

3 Translator's note: Etat-Major Interarmées de Zone de Défense (EMIAZD).

4 Translator's note: Délégué Militaire Départemental (DMD).

5 Translator's note: Défense Opérationnelle du Territoire (DOT).

6 Translator's note: Opération extérieure (OPEX).

**Should I conclude** and close the souvenirs book, often "strong" memories about civil-military cooperation and dialog, it would be necessary **to question the improper word association "crisis management"**.

Very fortunately, the established procedures, the planning effort made with our partners outside the crisis periods, the permanent exchange of information, and the increasing interoperability of the military and civilian structures are strengthening the existing organization.

**The joint territorial defense organization, more accomplished than its civilian counterpart, proves its effectiveness on a regular basis** and offers original military "jobs", often enriching but sadly not much known.



# Peace Support Operations Today

Peace support missions make up the bulk of the commitment of our forces since the end of the cold war. Crises are more and more complex, the military contribute to initiatives pertaining to their prevention. **The cooperation between civilians and the military, inter-ministry coordination, is essential to jointly solve the crisis with the aim of reaching a final stable end state** favoring smooth running of institutions and the return to normal life for populations. It is likely that the use of force will continue within the framework of interventions within coalitions whose legitimacy will have to be justified. Following the difficulties encountered during the treatment of the Iraqi crisis, the UN could reinforce its authority this year on the occasion of its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary thanks to significant reform.

BY COLONEL FRANÇOIS ESTRATE, JOINT STAFF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION

## France Deeply Committed in Peace Support Missions

“Contribute to actions in favor of peace and for the respect of international law”: this is **one of the four missions assigned to our armed forces**.

The mission of maintaining international security falls under the protection of the vital interests of our nation and mainly derives from our status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

This position endows us with influence over as well as a true responsibility for all international issues.

Loyal towards its principles and commitments, standing by its allies and friends, France involves itself in **prevention and resolution of crises**.

Together with the United Kingdom, France is one of the rare European countries to have kept a tradition of overseas intervention everywhere in the world.

Permanently, 15 to 20 000 of our military are deployed, without taking into account the 10 000 French military who are pre-positioned around the world, mainly in Africa.

France is the only European country benefiting from such a wide disposition.

## Peace Support Operations (PSO), Complex and Large Interventions

Placed in a perspective aiming at maintaining regional stability, the PSOs globally aim at denying belligerents the opportunity to continue or resume their hostilities. PSOs are listed as UN missions<sup>1</sup>, they are essentially conducted within a multinational framework. With humanitarian objectives, PSOs fight the roots of the disease and accordingly civilian and military assets come simultaneously into play.

Force impartiality, which must be distinguished from neutrality, is the basic rule.

The classical typology of operations places **PSOs between emergency assistance operations, with no outbreak of hostilities, and war operations**. Carried out under UN mandate and in accordance with the spirit of chapters VI and VII of the

UN Charter, the PSOs are carried out by one or more voluntary States, an international organization or by the UN itself.

Using all military courses of action, PSOs encompass the now well-known operations of: support to preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace restoration, peace enforcement and peace consolidation.



CCH J.J. CHATARD/SIRPA TERRE

## The Prevention of Conflicts in Africa Thanks to Military Cooperation

Africa lives through endemic crises. It is on this continent that the United Nations have the greatest number of peacekeeping missions. At the same time, a great deal of African States react by demonstrating their will to carry out PSOs and to endow themselves with crisis management assets for this purpose.

In this perspective, three main countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and France have developed military cooperation programs with their traditional African partners. The French Defense has conceived, developed and implemented since the mid-90's, the concept of the reinforcement of African peace-keeping capabilities (RECAMP).

This large cooperation structure aims at a threefold objective: development of regional political integration, emergence of an African preventive diplomacy, creation of a military operations capacity by Africans on their continent under the aegis of the UN. As far as this latter objective is concerned, RECAMP aims at preparing military officers and NCOs in the execution of PSOs and at training staffs to procedures, thanks to the organization of seminars, forums, multinational exercises and training actions.

To further push forward this initiative, France relies on the three key players that will enable the Africans to take over one day the control of their security, namely: the African sub-regional organizations, the EU and the African Union.

## Crises Settlement Thanks to Closely Linked Civilian and Military Actions

In 1992, in his agenda for peace, M. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN General Secretary, stated that peace is not only the matter of the United Nations or States, but also that of non-governmental organizations, of schools, members of parliament, business and professional communities, media, and of the public.

Since wars and conflicts have deep roots, the international community must deploy all its efforts to reinforce the respect of human rights and fundamental liberties and to favor social and economic development.

This recommendation is still valid and even more, the present analysis of risks and threats against security and international stability argues for a global collective defense.

The world is more and more unstable, unbalanced, more asymmetrical, due to the simultaneous and long-lasting "Failed State"<sup>2</sup> phenomenon, the materialization of transnational mass terrorism and to the reinforcement of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as technologies and conventional weaponry.

**A threat against one of the States is a threat for all** and every State however powerful it might be cannot shield itself alone.

The settlement of crises should therefore involve more and more players. These will have to operate jointly to reach the final state of eliminating the threat against security but at the same time preserving the

conditions enabling a political, social and economic long-lasting reconstruction.

The demands pertaining to **the fight against terrorists**, notably in terms of intelligence should further enhance relations between the security and defense spheres.

In this context, **inter-ministry coordination becomes a must in all steps of the operation**, from pre-decision phase to intervention and later to the withdrawal of military forces and end of the crisis.

The **integration of military actions in a general strategy** will ease the search and achievement of expected effects. But the networking of an ever increasing number of players within the framework of multinational coalitions will obviously have consequences over planning and conduct of our operations. The military will have to plan, measure, and adapt the effects of their actions not only for the success of their arms but also for the global success of the operation.

As a member of the MIC<sup>3</sup> and participating in the MNE<sup>4</sup>, the French armed forces contribute, along with their counterparts from countries wishing to take lead-nation responsibilities, to studies and experimentations aimed at establishing the conditions of better preparation for future coalition actions. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany are resolutely committed to this process. The approach is complex and ambitious but it will enable us to place the actions of the military within a new context and to make essential choices for the future organization and equipment of our forces and operations planning and conduct staffs.

## Towards a UN Reform in 2005?

In 2000, the Brahimi report outlined the **UN limits** as far as crisis management, its material and financial assets, lack of commitment of nations to supply equipped, trained and rapidly deployable troops are concerned. It also acknowledged that peace enforcement demands use of force that in practice is out of reach for the organization which in this case must call upon coalitions either ad hoc or led by other organizations (NATO, EU).

The legitimacy of the use of force sends us back to the legitimacy of the international bodies that make the decisions, in this case the UN General Assembly and Security Council.

The UN moral authority based upon the confidence of nations must be reinforced.

A new debate on the **UN reform** will take place as soon as spring 2005. It is already fed by the publication in December 2004 of the report made by the high-level key figures set up by Secretary General Kofi Annan. This report gives a more global analysis on the functioning of the organization than the one previously carried out.

<sup>1</sup> Since the Washington summit, NATO has replaced the acronym peace support operation (PSO) by crisis response operation (CRO).

<sup>2</sup> "Failed States" are States that can no longer run their institutions smoothly, and implement the state of law.

<sup>3</sup> Multinational Interoperability Council: members, Germany, Australia, Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States of America, observers: Italy, New Zealand, NATO.

<sup>4</sup> Multinational experimentation: organized by the USJFCOM with the participation of MIC nations and NATO.

# *The Legal Framework and the Rules of Engagement for Land Forces Contribution to Public Security in External and Internal Operations*

## The Legal Framework in External and Internal Operations: Convergences and Divergences

While the notion of overseas operations is a notion which now belongs to the day to day vocabulary of the military - to the extent that it is not rare to be known by a recruit at the time of his first enlistment - the notion of internal operations is a more recent notion, even if it has won its patent of nobility, be it only in the acronyms so dear to our institution. The paradox is not small, when considering that the armed forces intervention outside the national territory is historically a more recent phenomenon than the conduct of missions given to the armed forces in the national territory. The contribution of armed forces, notably land ones, to public security, as it represents a mission that can be exercised both outside and inside the national territory concurs to the connection of the notions of outside and inside operations. This link is naturally reinforced by the idea that the same personnel may be led to act in these two types of operations, that this same personnel can use the same know-how or also due to the fact that the same issue of the use of force and weapons is indiscriminately raised. However, if some convergences are in favor of such a connection, there is a **field that presents divergences**. It is **that of the legal framework**, in other words that of the legitimacy and lawfulness of the contribution of land forces to public security depending on the territory of intervention.

BY COLONEL THIERRY BOURLLOT, HEAD OF THE MILITARY LEGAL SECTION OF THE LOGISTICS DIVISION, ORGANIZATION AND HUMAN RESOURCES, JOINT STAFF

### The Mandate Assigned to Land Forces in Overseas Operations

Any outside operation must, in one way or another, reconcile with the principle of national sovereignty, one of whose attributes is indeed public security. In the framework of today's overseas operations, it is possible to **distinguish between bilateral interventions and multilateral ones**. Within the first framework, the mandate given to land forces can only be based upon defense agreements, whose conditional clauses are generally explicit<sup>1</sup> as far as the contribution to public

security of a foreign State is concerned. The implementation of defense cooperation in terms of defense is not retained from the moment when a typical clause to this sort of agreement expressly forbids any participation of armed forces in the internal affairs of a sovereign State.

The second framework, the most frequent one, covers the mandate defined by a multinational body able to provide an intervention legitimacy to the armed forces on the territory of a sovereign State: here we are concerned with the implementation of the United Nations Charter and of UN Security Council resolutions

(UNSC). When looking into the various resolutions, it turns out that the mandate, with a few exceptions, is never as explicit as the military commander appointed for its execution would like it to be. Indeed, the express mention of

contribution to public security does not necessarily appear. In the mission given to the military force, the contribution to the reestablishment of the state of law, the participation into some public activities or else the support to the



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organization of specific civilian activities may be mentioned. More recently the notions of disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reinstallation and rehabilitation appeared in these mandates. Last, a new field is opened by a last notion dealing with the fight against organized crime. It may be stressed that, within the framework of UNSC mandates, henceforth adopted, pertaining to military operations, under Chapter VII of the 1945 Charter, the units of the formed force may be authorized to “take all measures deemed necessary to accomplish their mission”. Still remains that the constant broadening of contributions demanded to military units raises the **question of the increased transfer to the military of the exercise of civilian activities.**

## The Internal Mission of Land Forces

While specific competences are legally acknowledged to the Navy and the Air Force, respectively as far as maritime and air missions pertaining to the defense of the territory<sup>2</sup>, the land missions pertaining to the defense of the territory are solely based on decree # 73-235 dated March 1 1973 dealing with the territorial operational defense (DOT). The 1<sup>st</sup> article of this decree plans for a mission “at all times, to participate in the protection of military installations” and the implementation of DOT measures “in case of an external threat” or “in case of invasion”. However it is obvious that the above quoted competences, although they can participate

in public security, do not represent all the internal actions that the land forces carry out to this end. It should also be noted that the exceptional legal frameworks are intentionally not taken into account in this analysis.

On the national territory, the first requirement remains to underline that **public security is placed under the responsibility of civilian authorities.** Depending on the situation, these authorities solely take on the management of this responsibility or, while keeping the coordination of actions taken, turn to military units and their assets. In practice, **the contribution of land forces to public security answers two legal frameworks, requisition and request for assistance.** The request for assistance is governed by the inter-ministry instruction dated January 18 1984 pertaining to the participation of the armed forces to missions coming under other ministerial departments. Requisitions are of a different nature, judicial, civilian and administrative. In this latter category may be placed the requisitions planned for by inter-ministry instruction # 500/SGDN/MPS/OTP pertaining to the participation of armed forces in the maintenance of law and order.

Although the above quoted texts are still in force, **the implementation of the Vigipirate Plan has revived the reflection on the legal framework governing the intervention of land forces.** In fact, up till now, in accordance with ministerial arbitration, the employment of these forces within the framework of the Vigipirate

Plan remains based on the request for assistance. However, this arbitration demonstrated the requirement for studying the adaptation of the set of regulations best corresponding to the participation of the military services in the Vigipirate Plan. The new 2003 Vigipirate plan plans for vigilance, prevention and protection measures that are wider, stronger and more coercive than those of the previous plan. The commitment of armed forces is more significant, in accordance with a progressive principle rising up to “the priority intervention of all available defense assets”, when the highest alert level is activated. The requested study led to the conclusion that it is better to place land forces under the legal regime of requisition. As the participation of land forces in innovating missions cannot be assimilated to sheer maintenance of order, **the need for a new text** was supported and a draft of inter-ministry instruction pertaining to the commitment of armed forces in accordance with the Vigipirate Plan came to light. The first objective of this project is to validate a better well-ordered organization between civilian and military authorities integrating the roles given on the one hand to the representatives of the interior ministry, of internal security and local liberties, and on the other to the Armed Forces Chief of Staff through the operations planning and conduct center, as representative of the defense ministry. Therefore, the second objective is to unify this type of requisition, available to the prefects, as the sole legal framework of employment of military units

and of their assets for operations in connection with the Vigipirate Plan. This project of instruction is presently undergoing the last inter-ministry consultations before its final drafting.

## The Legal Protection of Intervening Parties and Use of Force

Whatever the operation may be, the need for a legal protection of the military personnel called to intervene is recognized notably when the use of force is involved in the exercise of the missions to be fulfilled. **Besides the cases of self-defense, the framework for the use of force is stated in the rules of engagement (ROEs).** Obviously of course, although this use of force is a transverse notion, its perimeter is different between overseas and internal operations, operations over the national territory clearly having a limit with self-defense. Depending on this perimeter, the need for legal protection being potentially more important in overseas operations, calling for a specific answer the reform draft of the military personnel general statute is included in its article 17.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Which does not exclude that they might be of a confidential nature.

<sup>2</sup> Decree # 73-237 dated March 2 1973 pertaining to the maritime defense of the territory, decree # 78-272 dated March 9 1978 pertaining to the organization of State actions at sea on one hand and decree # 75-930 dated October 10 1975 pertaining to air defense on the other.

<sup>3</sup> “Is not criminally liable, the military who, in compliance with international law regulations and within the framework of a military operation taking place outside the French national territory, exercises coercion measures or uses armed force, or issues orders to this extent, when this proves necessary to the accomplishment of his mission”.

## SHORT SUMMARY ABOUT TERRITORIAL OPERATIONAL DEFENSE (DOT)

based on extracts of decree # 73 – 325 dated March 1 1973

*"The territorial operational defense, in liaison with other forms of military defense and civilian defense, occurs to maintain liberty and action continuity of the Government as well as the preservation of bodies essential to the defense of the nation.*

*The missions of the military authorities that are responsible for its execution are:*

- *at any time, to participate in the protection of military installations and, in priority, in those of the strategic nuclear force;*
- *when facing an outside threat recognized by the defense committee or an aggression, and in accordance with the conditions stated in articles 3 and 5 here below, to ensure on the ground the general coverage of the national territory and oppose actions undertaken by the enemy inside this territory;*
- *in case of invasion, to conduct military resistance operations which, with other forms of combat, demonstrate the national will to reject the ruling of the enemy and to eliminate him "*

*"Upon governmental decision applicable to all or part of one or several areas, to put into play the territorial operational defense measures, the appointed commanders take command*

*in the concerned areas. They then exercise the powers endowed to higher commands by article 24 of the edict dated January 7 1959 quoted above. They implement the defense plans under the authority of the Joint Chief of Staff or the General Joint Chief of Staff either directly or through an operational commander". (In a part of the national territory, then called "temporary operational sector", the defense area commander or an appointed military commander prepares and conducts the necessary military actions ; in practice he is endowed with the powers of a commander-in-chief in an area of operation.)*

*"The area commanders express the essential operational requirements and the area prefects are responsible for their satisfaction in priority.*

*In the circumstances and conditions as stated forth in the sixth and seventh paragraphs of the article 17 of the above quoted edict dated January 7 1959, the responsibility for public order and the coordination of civilian defense measures with the military defense measures may be given to the military command by the Government "*

The redaction

# Rules of Engagement on Overseas or National Territory Operations, Employment Vision

The ROEs or “rules of engagement” concept took form in the 70’s within the American army. NATO and the EU were the first ones to endow themselves with a doctrine and a catalog of “ROEs”. The various overseas operations in which we participated contributed to render “ROEs” of common use within the French armed forces. Since the month of July 2004 they may be found in two national documents: the PIAs<sup>1</sup> 05-203 and 05-400 one deals with the doctrine pertaining to the use of force in overseas operations and the other addresses specific directives and the rules of engagement index. The rules of engagement for operations taking place on the national territory fall under another issue.

**Legal and operational tools, the rules of engagement cannot be enforced over the national territory in the same way they can in external theaters, as the legal framework is different.** Nevertheless, there is a certain relationship between them, which shows during the various steps of the process ranging from their preparation to their implementation.

BY COLONEL (GENDARMERIE) JEAN-LOU MONOT, JOINT STAFF EMPLOYMENT DIVISION



ADC CHESNEAU/SIRPA TERRE

## A Principle Created to Control the Use of Force During Overseas Operations

The PIA 05 - 203 restates that, ***“the rules of engagement are the directives issued by an appointed military authority agreed at political level ...”***. The implementation primary mechanism is essential as far as the intrinsic value of rules of engagement is concerned. When a crisis breaks out, a limited defense council chaired by the President of the Republic<sup>2</sup> decides upon the intervention of our forces. The “Politic” decides, states the political objectives of the intervention, the imperatives, the “Military” fulfills these demands. In a first step, the thinking process over rules of engagement is carried out in

the framework of the initial planning directive and the complementary planning instructions which translate into military terms the political orientations directives as far as the use of force is concerned. This analysis and preparation work is carried out by the operations planning and conduct center (CPCO) in liaison, if needed, with the various divisions of the joint staff, the various services staffs and with any other useful department or direction. A first draft of the rules of engagement is presented in the concept of operations (CONOPS), approved by the Armed Forces CoS and then submitted to the “Politic”. Once this CONOPS is validated, a profile<sup>3</sup> is drafted. This profile is referenced in annex “E” of the operations plan (OPLAN).

It is this “political” validation which, in addition, justifies the measures taken in the new general statutes of military personnel in its 17-24 article. The rules of engagement then become the true military directives defining the circumstances and the conditions in which force can be used during overseas operations. This control of force is made from the highest down to the lowest level. Indeed, **each level recalls and disseminates the rules of engagement**. Each level receives the “authorized” rules from the upper echelon and disseminates to its subordinates the ones they will need. The subordinate may in turn ask his commander the rules he has retained that he needs to complete his mission. The clarity and flexibility of the rules of engagement

process are certainly **one of the most suitable tools** for the conduct of operations, the regulation of the use of force and its a posteriori control. These are the qualities that the “Military” could be tempted to introduce in its interventions over the national territory.

## A Concept which is not Extendable as Such to the Engagements of Forces Over the National Territory

Given the legal and operational framework prevailing over the national territory, the rules of engagement differ.

**Interventions over the national territory are linked to legal frameworks that are more varied than during overseas operations.** May be quoted: states of exception<sup>5</sup>,



operational defense of the territory (DOT), maintenance of law and order<sup>6</sup>, engagement of armed forces in accordance with governmental plan of vigilance, prevention and protection against threats of terrorist actions (Vigipirate plan), participation of the armed forces in providing security during great events<sup>7</sup>, interventions deriving from an assistance request<sup>8</sup>. As an example, let's look into the participation of the military services in the Vigipirate<sup>9</sup> plan. The process starts with the Prime Minister's decision to activate the plan. The Armed Forces CoS through the CPCO ensures the centralization of the general conduct of military operations and the management of engaged assets. The inter-ministry instruction (IM) draft states that the commitment of the armed forces is made by means of requisitions<sup>10</sup> issued by the defense district prefect to the OGZD<sup>11</sup> and that rules of engagement will be included in operational plans and orders established by the CPCO and sent to the OGZD or to the COMSUPs<sup>12</sup>, the same rules being used by all the hierarchical chain.

At this moment, we are close to the first process, except that all the planning phase up to the OPLAN is summed

up into the requisition. This requisition is the legal expression of the mission assigned to the military services in a space - time framework. The prefect has an essential role as far as the coordination of departments over his territory is concerned especially in terms of public security. The implementation process is further completed thanks to intermediary steps: the relationships between “doers” and the OGZD, OGZD - prefect of the district, OGZD - CPCO, Armed Forces CoS - National Defense General Secretary (SGDN), which are not successive layers but dialog echelons according to the level of raised issues. The rules of engagement adapted to execution levels are the expression of the necessary dialog between the demanding authority and the military command, taking up again all or some complement information stated in the requisition.

**As in overseas operations, the rules of engagement first deal with the use of force, being understood that over the national territory the absolute limit remains determined by self-defense.**

There is no immunity linked to the mission execution as for overseas operations, each use of force must be

justified. Furthermore, on top of the public security constraints, over a territory divided between the national police district director for public security and the district gendarmerie group commander, the constraints<sup>13</sup> of the judicial police under the authority of the Republic Prosecutor must be added. Last, in a country that has had an eventful social and political History, the intervention of “the army” on the national territory always raises issues besides situations in which it is the case of bringing assistance to populations. It is not obvious for a tool reserved for military overseas operations to be accepted straight away for interventions on the national territory.

If the rules of engagement strictly pertain to the field of the use of force, the **behavior rules** aimed at determining the behavior of units and personnel, undoubtedly enable to better adapt to employment constraints over the national territory. As they only involve the chain of command and engaged units, they are the **indispensable complement to rules of engagement** for this commitment.

- 1 PIA: Joint Publication.
- 2 Article 15 of the Constitution: the President is the supreme commander of the armies.
- 3 Profile: according to the Anglo-Saxon terminology in force within NATO and the EU, precursors in this field of ROEs, entire set of rules that are deemed useful for the operation.
- 4 Article pertaining to the penal immunity of the military on overseas operations within the framework of the fulfillment of their mission and in respect of international law.
- 5 Defense Code. Part 2. 1<sup>st</sup> Book. State of Siege (Section II), State of Emergency (Section III).
- 6 IM 500/SGDN/MPS/OTP dated May 9, 1995.
- 7 Evian G8 Summit, 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Liberation, patriotic demonstrations in Paris (July 14.).
- 8 IM dated January 18, 1984
- 9 An IM draft based on the requisition principle is under completion.
- 10 Article L. 1321-1 of the Defense Code.
- 11 OGZD: General Officer Commanding a Defense District.
- 12 COMSUP: Overseas territories Higher Commands.
- 13 Article 73 of the criminal procedure pertaining to the arrest of authors of obvious crimes and offences, enabling patrols to seize a person and to transfer it into the custody of the Judicial Police Officer having the appropriate territorial jurisdiction.
- 14 Heads of States Meeting at Nice, Evian G8 Summit, 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Liberation, Pope trip to Lourdes, etc...

On the national territory, **the rules of engagement remain a performing tool in order to master the use of force**, even if their application sphere is notably reduced in comparison with that of overseas operations. At internal level, the elaboration of a doctrine pertaining to rules of engagement requires time in order to take into account lessons already learnt<sup>14</sup>. One must not forget that almost thirty years were needed to benefit from “ROEs for overseas operations”. It may be hoped that we will go much faster “inside” as long as we do not cut the stops, adequate education steps are taken within our forces as well as with the civilian world and we remain demanding for ourselves.

# The Army's Operational Engagement in the National Territory

Monday 08h00 a.m. Paris, Gare de l'Est.

Mister Civilian is surprised to meet Sergeant Infantryman on a Vigipirate patrol. The two men met four years ago in the Somme region. Mister Civilian was suffering from a direct hit by the floods, he was on the verge of despair and had particularly appreciated the arrival of these military people he did not know and who had enabled him to leave his house in a "zodiac" rubber boat. Those who had patrolled with the police to deter the looters from breaking into the houses left empty by their owners were also soldiers.

**The Army's operational engagement on the national territory is a daily reality** before being a concept.

Thanks to this acknowledgement the Army is a recognized actor in the "national theater".

BY COLONEL MICHEL CLOT, FROM THE ARMY STAFF/BPO

## The National Territory: a Complex Framework of Action

The general environment in which the Army is going to operate is particularly complex. It includes varied notions, often not known to the military such as the legal or social aspects or the knowledge of the other State services.

Therefore the study of the general environment must at once take into account French law, European

regulations and international law. The **global nature of defence** as it is defined in the ordinance dated 07 January 1959 must also be kept in mind. Decision makers are permanently faced with a potential crisis situation. Parallely citizens are particularly demanding. They desire increasing involvement of the administration, specifically concerning security matters. The considerable weight of the media also increases the resulting demands from the State services.

Because of its limited means, when facing a major crisis, the administration has to redirect its efforts on the shortest notice and to reallocate the resources according to the needs. If it has no immediately available means, the State may find it difficult to respond to the urgent needs of the population or to guarantee the continuity of its action and the operation of its services.

## The Army : a Fast Developing Actor

The Army has shifted from a conscript army exclusively trained to respond to a major threat directly applied at our borders to a professional Army ready to intervene in a large spectrum of situations and prepared to be projected. Taking into account the

missions assigned to the armed forces, the preparation of the ground forces had, in the same time, to adapt itself to urban engagements, against terrorist threats or in contact with crowds and actors very different from the past enemy. In this type of engagement, it is more important to deter, to watch, to control than to aim at the systematic and global destruction of the adverse forces whether military or not.

Simultaneously the important decrease of the strength that came with the change to professionalism and the reduction of the number of garrisons had two main consequences: on the one hand it led to a decrease in the number of units likely to be placed under military command at the disposal of the civilian authorities in the framework of the defence of the territory; on the other



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hand it caused a potential remoteness of the engagement zones de facto multiplying the likely intervention lead time. Finally, while **the ground forces** are today a coherent and global set of means ready to fulfill the missions written down in the operational contract assigned to the Army, **their new size makes it impossible to specialize or dedicate any capability to a particular strategic position or function.**

## The Army : a Fully-Fledged Actor

In addition to the permanent steps taken in the framework of the security permanent position (PPS) the missions assigned to the Army in a “national territory, overseas, abroad” continuum may fall under two domains, the civilian security and the general security. Of course some public service missions participating to the operation of the public services and to the continuity of action of the State remain theoretically possible but the missions of direct support to the population to respond to particular events, natural in origin or not, are the largest part of these interventions.

This type of mission is always greatly appreciated by the concerned population who a contrario might not understand the inaction of its Army. Such actions are the strongest way to reinforce the link between the Army and the nation. On the other hand, the general security missions that are sometimes performed to complete the missions of direct support to the population, aim at reinforcing, thanks to its own specificities, the action of the police and gendarmerie forces or even of other State actors. Besides, depending on its means and its various deployments abroad, the Army may, if need be and according to the guidelines provided by the State authorities, take part to prevention actions against potential or actual threats.

## The Army : an Actor Aware of the Employment Principles he has to Respect

The operational coherence must be protected by the adoption and the respect of **a few principles that will, without ambiguity, show the Army as a complementary actor to be engaged upon**



## request by the civilian authorities to face exceptionnal situations.

Therefore, the Army wants to assert itself as a full-fledged and complementary actor, but it does not want in any way to compete with its civilian or military partners. It wishes to prioritize the use of its specific know-hows and its specialized equipment. Since it is constituted with highly qualified professional soldiers **its vocation is not to be used as a manpower tank for the reinforcement or even for the ease of others.**

Besides, the engagement of ground forces can only be upon request by the civilian authorities. They must express their needs in terms of effects to be obtained in a well-defined space-time framework and leave to the military authorities the development of courses of

action and the choice of the means to be implemented in the strict respect of the received guidelines. The departmental military representatives who are directly subordinated to the Armed forces General Staff are then useful advisors to the civilian authorities.

Finally this engagement must never become a habit but occur only in exceptional situations. It must be accepted for a **limited period** by the end of the considered crisis or by the return of the non military capabilities to the ability to solve it; the action on the national territory must not interfere with the projection and action capabilities outside our borders.

**As a conclusion,** the participation of the Army to operations conducted for many years on the national territory and the lessons learned from them permit **to define the nature of the missions that can be assigned to it.**

Besides, the Army size reduction following the professionalization requires **that the limited human and material resources be used wisely** even if they have increased capabilities as regards the fielded equipment as well as the acquired know-hows. Therefore, whether we consider the specific capabilities it has, the permanent steps it takes (means on alert, dispositions to protect facilities among others), whether we also consider the dispositions of the overseas pre-positioned troops (prevention) or those in operation outside the borders (action - projection), the Army is already participating in the protection of the national territory.

**The conception of the whole set of actions to be conducted by the Army as part of the civilian defence** (civilian security and general security) must therefore be studied in this very broad framework.



# Army NRBC

## Operations on National Territory

On September 11, 2001, the Al Qaïda terrorist organization hit the United States in the very heart of New York City by destroying the World Trade Center twin towers, killing more than 3,000 people. Nine hundred days later, March 11, 2003, simultaneous explosions on several trains in Madrid during the early rush hour struck the Spanish population and killed almost 200. The AZF plant accident in Toulouse is only the most recent case among our national catastrophes. The two common features of these events is the **large number of victims generated in the population**, and less importantly, **the significant level of property damage**.

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL CUNY, (CFAT, NRBC DEPARTMENT CHIEF)

Among the potential scenarios that we might confront, those instigated by international terrorism certainly have the strongest psychological impact due to their unpredictability and associated consequences. One might raise legitimate questions about the potential impact of these events had radiological, biological, or chemical products been present. Subsequently, what are the assets at our disposal, especially within the Army, to respond to such crises ?

There is currently a growing concern about **our real ability to intervene on national territory in the event of a radiological, biological or chemical incident**, but the concern itself is not new. Anticipating its potential contribution within this specific framework, the

Army recently carried out a major study on its current and future potential. Hitherto, this contribution was formalized at joint level by a protocol that would allow the Defense Ministry, upon requisition

or after a specific request for assistance, to provide the Ministry of Interior with specific personnel and equipment. In 2003, the Army Chief of Staff decided to **add to existing NRBC**

**capability** by standing up a NRBC defense group (currently at Draguignan moving to Fontevraud in 2005). By 2008 this group will have a regimental structure of 7 companies (namely 5



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


## INTEGRATION WITHIN CIMIC ORGANIZATION

Central level

Defense area

Department



NRBC companies, 1UCL<sup>1</sup> and 1 UAS<sup>2</sup>). One of the consequences of this decision was to **redefine the employment concepts for this unit** as part of NRBC involvement on national territory.

This was the **subject of a study by the CFAT<sup>3</sup> for the Army staff. The Army staff has not yet validated the conclusions** drawn by the working group. In conjunction with joint and interdepartmental offices, it wishes to make sure that the proposals are consistent with the objectives set forth in

development concepts. The process will assess the relevance of the entire set of proposals before approving them.

The following will present only **proposals brought forth** during the above-mentioned study. For the time being they are not official decisions.

### Nature and Framework of Commitment

Intervention on our national territory encompasses both **support missions**

**to public services and assistance missions** the Army might have to conduct at the request of administrative authorities. National plans such as PIRATOX, BIOTOX and PIRATOME describe particular methods to reinforce public services, to employ the assets available, and procedures in the event of NRBC incidents. The essential element remains meeting a NRBC threat and of conducting an operation to assist the population in an NRBC environment.

## Mission

The Army's objective is to provide know-how in **support of first aid units assisting civilian populations** during three specific portions of a crisis:

- first aid
- control and management
- reconstitution

## Capabilities

NRBC's specific intervention capabilities consist primarily of the Land Component Command's **NBC defense Group**, and the **12 medical decontamination units** belonging to the two medical regiments of the Land Logistic Force (FLT).

**Modularity** remains the major structural advantage of these operational units and enables the Army to respond to a particular effects-based request by fielding powerful, tailored assets.

These elements can:

- **Conduct reconnaissance and sample probing missions**, intended to analyze and identify toxic agents by virtue of the NBC RECCE<sup>4</sup> VAB in particular, a piece of equipment that constitutes a true mobile laboratory as well as the spearhead of NRBC defense. This mission can

also be conducted using EREs (reconnaissance and evaluation teams) capable of conducting specific analysis and assessing risky situations.

- **Carry out crisis management operations:** by delineating and immediately communicating to the decisional level the geographical limits of contaminated areas, thus allowing an alert about the progress of a possible toxic cloud to be disseminated to the population, or an alert about the existence of an area contaminated by radioactive material.
- Provide assistance by activating sites for **treating people** (wounded or not), as well as reconditioning equipment and infrastructure via the VLRA NBC, soon to be upgraded with a new piece of equipment, the SDA (system for in-depth decontamination).

Any intervention on national territory constitutes a very specific situation. It requires being very reactive in order to be effective. Notwithstanding the possibility of a pre-existing protocol, the creation of an intervention unit of reference with structural characteristics enabling it to address all the above listed

operations has been recommended. Its characteristics are:

- a specific non-dedicated module, both OPINT<sup>5</sup> and OPEX<sup>6</sup> capable;
- air transportable, for rapid deployment;
- self-sufficient, including C2 elements and specialized support cell;
- adaptable, according to the "plug and play" principle, which would enable it to be immediately included in national and/or international organizations without particular adjustment;
- an operational architecture built around a key nucleus comprising C2, liaison, and support cells to which could be aggregated reconnaissance and/or decontamination cells enabling various adjustments while holding to the "no more than absolutely necessary" rule.

Although appropriately tailored, but taking advantage of its high performance capability and proven personnel, this module represents a **flexible and effective operational solution** able to significantly contribute to NRBC situations, on civilian behalf, within the overall Civil Military Cooperation structure.

- 1 Command and liaison company.*
- 2 Admin. and combat support company.*
- 3 Land Forces Command.*
- 4 Infantry Fighting vehicle dedicated to NBC reconnaissance.*
- 5 Operations on national territory.*
- 6 Operations outside of the national territory.*

**By 2008**, the Army should be able to simultaneously deploy **four of these modules** providing a capacity to treat several hundred persons per hour. The Army continues to **fine-tune its wherewithal** with this type of unit giving it a larger index of operational and ad-hoc responses. The Army will thus be **ready to deal with NRBC incidents of any nature** for deployed forces, and provide public services with credible and customized assistance on national territory.



# From Maritime Defense to Maritime Safeguard

Navy participation in the strategic task of “protection” implies it should protect the nation against any danger coming from the sea. These dangers evolve, increase, sometimes overlap and sometimes lose their military character. In addition, the perception of their relative importance has changed by virtue of media coverage, the emergence of terrorist attacks, and accidents. The Navy has had to redefine once again the characteristics of its mission of protection, then to adapt its resources and their employment within this permanently evolving environment. The Navy is currently being reorganized in order to improve its performance in this new environment. This new organization could serve as an example of how military resources might be used in Europe within the framework of protection missions: maritime safeguard.

BY COMMANDER AUGUSTIN CHAMPETIER DE RIBES, STAFF OFFICER AT THE LESSONS LEARNED DESK (NAVY HEADQUARTERS “OPS-LOG” DIVISION)

SIRPA MARINE/N. NOCART



In the course of the last few years, new threats coming from the sea seem to have replaced the traditional military threats that had seemed to diminish after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet block. In fact, sea accidents, maritime pollution, as well as law and order infringement have become more frequent. Actually public opinion, looking for a “peace dividend,” also demands to be protected by the government against these new threats that range from pollution of the coasts, to

sea-based mass terrorism, encompassing drug trafficking, and clandestine immigration. To confront these very diverse threats and risks, which stem from far in the open sea, requires the implementation of capabilities and courses of action that are military most of the time. The French Navy is currently developing a new concept the maritime safeguard that constitutes a synthesis of both the missions of public service and defense conducted in collaboration with seafaring national and foreign administrations.

## Necessary Upgrade for Surveillance and Intervention

Although the risks of a major conflict seem to be vanishing, new types of maritime threats are appearing. Their major characteristics are composite in nature threatening our country's security and our economic interests. The oceans represent a place for exchange and exploitation, indispensable for States' development. This is why maritime powers had made an attempt to promote and defend the freedom of the seas; this attempt was formalized by the Montego Bay agreement signed with difficulty in 1982. This very freedom might be the origin of some new types of threats:

- ecological risks stemming from various potentially polluting cargoes transported at sea,
- economic and criminal risks as its implementation facilitated all sorts of illegal trade and criminal activities.

The negative consequences of this freedom are amplified by the huge difficulty of making international laws respected all over the immensity of the seas for lack of legal enforcement means.

These new threats added to the old ones finally supplanting them in the minds of the populations witnessing events such as “East Sea”, “Erika” or “Limburg”<sup>1</sup>. Populations now demand their governments also ensure their protection against this type of aggression. Such protection requires that intervention happen as far away from the coast as possible, especially because these threats are very hard to detect with very few means to do so.

The Navy is the only organization, out of the public services, able to intervene effectively on the open sea. In order to meet this requirement, the Navy adopted a new concept

**involving widened protection: the maritime safeguard.** Developed as a part of a global solution, this concept must make it possible for the Navy, including naval air forces, simultaneously to meet the requirements necessary for the military defense of the territory, e.g. demonstration of presence and monitoring of approaches, and those needed for serving the community and for representing the government at sea. Naval versatility and flexibility enabled it to adapt to this new concept of protection without notable difficulty.

## Maritime Safeguard: Synthesis of State Protection Requirements

Maritime safeguard is a **concept of Naval resource use**. It aims to organize the Navy's command structure and employment to monitor our approaches and to intervene on behalf of the state against all threats, military or not, exerted at sea or from the sea against our interests. Apart from purely military action, the Navy's tasks are then conducted **within the framework of "state action"** at sea and placed under the Prime Minister's authority, the main objectives being set by an inter-ministerial committee. The "secretariat-general of the sea," at the central level, as well as the maritime prefects and Navy general officers at local levels lead the various administrations' actions in continental France<sup>2</sup>. Overseas, it is the civilian representative of the government (prefect) that has this mission. In addition, the maritime prefects in continental France and Navy commanding officers overseas are in charge of the

local maritime zones. Through the joint operational chain of command, they thus provide the operational support needed for the employment of military means by the authorities in charge of conducting the interministerial action.

The role of the military chain of command is to **guarantee the synergy of all deployed resources between military missions and the other permanent missions in support of government agencies, thanks to the "permanent posture of maritime safeguard."**

Efficient use of maritime assets requires an extensive knowledge of maritime movements, all the more important when it affects our interests. It is then a question of analyzing and integrating all maritime intelligence collected by our various sensors. In the medium term, it will become possible to integrate some civilian assets into military ones in order to obtain a single, precise, and exploitable image; making it possible to have the advance notice required to prepare for any possible action. This is the object of the civilian program named SPATIONAV, which already integrates the information collected by coastal watchtowers and which in the future could allow networking of all military sensors embarked or airborne.

Intervention itself, within the framework of missions of "governmental actions at sea," is conducted under the Prime Minister's control through his representative, the maritime prefect (or the overseas' government representative). Police action is made possible **through special legal documents**

providing Navy ships and aircraft commanders with some limited ability to conduct criminal investigations thus enabling them to report any infringement of the law to relevant legal prosecutors.

## Necessary Joint, Inter-ministerial, and International Cooperation

In any case, such a team will be all the more powerful when all concerned organizations work together. This obviously relates first to the various organizations that are already present at sea: customs, maritime civilian administration, or the *gendarmerie*. It relates to other military services that, via the joint chain of command, can precede, enable, or extend the action of committed assets at sea. In the same way, protection of our interests against maritime threats would be useless without **international coordination**. Due to the permeability of EU countries land borders, the protection of the European coasts concerns us directly. The various national organizations in charge of these defense missions are extremely diverse, broadly speaking, and sometimes barely compatible. In addition to the technical interoperability problems, the participation of European navies' assets is often subject to severe employment restrictions that limit the possibilities of common action even more.

Thus it becomes necessary to seek new partners within the relevant ministries while demonstrating to the other navies the effectiveness and the lower cost of French organization. While seeking to promote the French

safeguard concept, the Navy aims at **building an overall, powerful, and cost-effective maritime protection against all sea borne threats**.

Lastly, it is not only a question of convincing official actors, but also of associating **safeguard** with the many civilian initiatives aiming to improve the safety of maritime transportation and contributing to the reduction of current threats. All this cooperation should lead to a **better control of maritime risks in the long term**.

**The maritime safeguard concept**, which enables the Navy to optimize the use of its assets against a wide spectrum of complex and changing threats, **offers an efficient and cost-effective response to the many authorities charged with protecting national interests**. It enables the government to avoid redundancy and competition among dedicated assets and constitutes an attractive example for the establishment of global European protection. It is certain, however, that maritime safeguard is **only one of the parts of a more complete international network** of the future that integrates complex legal and political provisions whose range and contents remain to be defined. These will likely exceed the maritime framework to offer a rational use of military assets in peace time for the safeguard of the nation's interests.

<sup>1</sup> East Sea is the name of a cargo ship that went ashore on the Mediterranean coast in 2001 with clandestine Kurdish refugees on board. The Erika was an oil tanker that sank on the coast of Brittany and caused much environmental damage. In 2002, the Limburg, a French tanker was attacked by a small suicide craft off the Yemen coast.

<sup>2</sup> Including Corsica.

# Permanent Air Security

## The French Exception

Until the collapse of the Berlin wall ending the Cold War, NATO countries regarded the air threat as essentially made of Warsaw Pact military aircraft. This analysis had led to a collective air security system based on sharing radar detection across Europe, and on pooling response assets. In addition, all NATO countries dedicated their own air defense.

Only France, since it had left in 1966 the alliance integrated military structure for deterrence reasons, had worked out **a fully autonomous organization of its own for airspace sovereignty.**

BY COLONEL (AIR FORCE) PIERRE EDERY IN CHARGE OF SECURITY POSTURE IN THE AIR DEFENSE AND AIR OPERATION COMMAND (CDAOA)



CDAOA

## Emergence of a New Threat

When the Soviet threat vanished, NATO's air defense naturally softened up.

The September 11 terrorist attacks were a brutal reminder of how important acute and permanent attention to protecting national territories and populations are. At the same time those attacks have thrown our countries into a fully new context: a multiform and multidirectional threat. For the first time an airliner has been used as a weapon.

Now nations have to face **a threat that conceals itself within a more and more dense commercial air traffic:** a civilian threat that only military aircraft or helicopters can oppose because of its potential speed.

Paradoxically, these puzzling events, far from challenging the current French air security organization, reinforced its basic principles: **sovereignty, political control of the use of force, and a shortened chain of command for commitment.**

## Permanent Air Security Posture: National Sovereignty

Air security results from the practice of state sovereignty and therefore is applied permanently. It is joint and interdepartmental by nature, because it concerns any airspace user, not only the military. The Air Force and more precisely the air defense and air operation command (CDAOA) have been entrusted with it by presidential decree (# 75-930). Its first constituent is surveillance.

### Awareness about what occurs in the air

The essential element is detection and monitoring of one thousand airplanes that routinely fly over our country and daily include more than ten thousand air movements. This task is entrusted to the one

hundred civilian and military radars integrated in the STRIDA<sup>1</sup> detection net and extended to the NADGE<sup>2</sup> system.

### The threat assessment

Identification supplements detection. Determining the identity of an airplane consists in correlating information from various sources: for example a radar plot and a flight plan. Identification makes a threat assessment possible. A classification system sorts the airplanes into four categories: friend, unknown, suspect, and hostile. This classification is made from updated information from various departments, however it



CDAOA



could depend on the very aircraft behavior: an aircraft that does not answer radio communications could be aggressive. An air route diversion could be the result of a terrorist attack.

**Five French military tactical air control centers** make a situation assessment in accordance with national directives, which can be submitted to government authorities immediately.

## Permanent Air Security Posture: Political Control of the Use of Force

A suspect aircraft is flying over the country. The “air defense high authority” (general officer head of the CDAOA (air defense and air operation command) or one of those few officers so nominated by the Secretary of Defense must then:

**Alert the Prime minister**  
Informing the authority in charge at the highest level is essential for the global effectiveness of the system. In France, pursuant to decree no. 75-930, this authority is the Prime Minister. In that capacity Matignon<sup>3</sup> is informed as soon as an event occurs that puts the air security of the country at risk.

**Intervene as necessary**  
When uncertainty makes response necessary it is run from the CAOC<sup>4</sup> located in Taverny and is active 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Fighter aircraft or helicopters carry out these responses depending on the flight data of the airplane to be engaged.

In case of a civilian attack, the countries that are signatories to the Chicago Convention regulating the air movement of people and goods, have undertaken to preserve the passengers’ safety. However one clause stipulates that, in case of self-defense, this obligation is no longer valid. In France only the Prime Minister or the President of the Republic may declare a national self-defense situation. In the advent of a blatant kamikaze attack carried out by an airliner, the use of force would be decided at the highest national level.

## Permanent Air Security Posture: A Shortened Chain of Command During Commitment

Because of the speed of aircraft, the decision chain should be very short in order to react immediately. This is why the air defense high authority on duty in Taverny has at his **disposal direct and secure links to the national authorities.**

### Post-September 11 adjustments

Without questioning the general principles mentioned above, the September 11, 2001 events have led to a **great adaptation of the national air security system.** Information, anticipation, and flexibility are the main objectives.

**Information collection** drives this process and is backed by enhanced interdepartmental cooperation. Thanks to an



increase in information flow, **measures can be anticipated in real-time** and changes can be planned in a timely manner.

**Flexibility** is a key to the effectiveness of our air security system. Based on collected information, responsive air assets can redeploy or reinforce. Those **fighter aircraft and helicopters** put on alert at various air bases could have their number doubled on request and guarantee a response capability on a very short notice. Moreover, particular set ups are regularly established for ceremonies or major events. **Additional means**, surface to air missiles, mobile radars, aircraft and helicopters locally supplement those projected by the national air security plan. Many “security bubbles” have been established during 2004: on July 14<sup>5</sup>, during various ceremonies to commemorate the Liberation, in Lourdes for the papal visit, on November 11, or in Guyana during a more sensitive satellite launch.

### Opening-up to Europe

There is no entirely satisfactory posture to fight terrorism that is strictly national. As the air

knows no frontiers, this consideration is especially relevant in air terrorism.

As a consequence, the Air Force has been recently tasked with **engaging in bilateral negotiations on air security with all countries that share a border with France.** Those agreements, one of which has already been finalized with Spain, aim to build continuity across the borders for dealing with sensitive flights. The objective is to prevent both partners from being taken by surprise by ensuring the possibility that interceptor aircraft control could be taken over by either country in order to conduct air security measures in two neighboring airspaces.

These various bilateral negotiations are based on common regulations. In the end it could be possible **to add them to a common European defense concept.**

<sup>1</sup> Translator's note: air defense data transmission and display system.

<sup>2</sup> NATO Air Defense Ground Environment.

<sup>3</sup> Translator's note: The hôtel Matignon is the name of the Parisian building where the office of the Prime minister is located.

<sup>4</sup> Translator's note: Combined Air Operations Center.

<sup>5</sup> Translator's note: Bastille Day.

# A Mutual Cooperation, LO (Law & Order) on the National Territory and in Overseas Operations

The latest geopolitical developments have led to a **development in the commitment of security forces**. The armed forces are committed on the national territory within the framework of the “VIGIPIRATE” program, thus reinforcing the organization of the gendarmerie and of the police services; it contributes to overall peace and LO missions. At the Minister of Defense behest, the Gendarmerie carries out operations in overseas theatres, where it implements its expertise in the area of LO.

BY COLONEL JEAN-PHILIPPE STER, DEFENSE ASSISTANT, FRENCH GENDARMERIE COMMAND

Within the framework of civil defense, **according to ordinance dated January 7, 1959, dealing with defense's general organization, the armed forces have no LO role on the national territory**; it is in this sense that inter-service ministerial directive Nr 500/SGSN dated May 9, 1995 supervises the participation of the armed forces in LO operations. The new position of the armed forces toward homeland security means that the government intends to increase the anti-terrorist structure with available assets. Within their public service role, the French Air Force and the French Navy already take part in the protection of the national territory through their actions in the areas of air cover and maritime protection. Coordinating their actions with all other homeland security players enables us to optimize the role of the government in meeting all kinds of attacks.

In exceptional conditions, the commitment of the armed forces within the framework of the government's program for “close watch, prevention, and protection to meet terrorist threats” (VIGIPIRATE program) and

within the framework of the protection and intervention programs against terrorism (PIRATE plans) contributes **to increase the vigilance level of the country to meet current threats**. Similarly, any commitment of the armed forces on the

national territory, to take part in increasing general security of the VIGIPIRATE plan and out of the protection and intervention programs against terrorism requires the enforcement of measures appropriate to the unaccustomed size of



ADJ DRAHI/SIRPA Terre

the organization to be set up. This is the case when there are massive events, such as the organization of the G8 summit in Evian in 2003 or the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the allied landing in Normandy in 2004. The variety of expertise and the specialized or rare support provided by the armed forces - normally unavailable in the gendarmerie or police forces - enable the administrative or judicial authority **to secure themselves the support of military authorities to carry out government missions**. However, the implementation of these measures should remain subordinated to political arbitrations owing to the specific purpose of the armed forces consisting in being committed out of the national territory.

Decree Nr 96-828, dated September 19, 1996, specifies that **national police and national gendarmerie are responsible for LO missions and they carry them out** in their respective areas of responsibility. In these conditions, under the prefect's authority, the armed forces committed on the national territory should coordinate with homeland security forces. By enforcing such a principle, we are assured of unity of effort for operations carried out by all committed forces. An exchange of information is the most convincing proof. The gendarmerie provides the armed forces with data enabling them to optimize the mission they have been tasked within their legal commitment framework. In real time, the armed forces provide the gendarmerie with gathered or notified

data, and they possibly take advantage of its commitment or of its expertise. For the gendarmerie, the operations carried out by the militaries should take place within an optimized and coherent structure of general security; it should favor an exchange of data. However, **we have to regard and respect the fact that the armed forces want to be considered as a security partner and not only as an asset provider; thus their initiative margin and the increase in value of their commitment will be appreciated**.

The increasing commitment of the national gendarmerie out of the national territory reflects the changes occurring in security and defense areas. The increasing interaction of homeland and external security sets the gendarmerie at the junction of the global security concept. 1,300 gendarmes are currently assigned out of France. More than 800 take part in operational missions in crisis areas, either within the framework of United Nations Security Council resolutions or to reinforce the security of diplomats and diplomatic facilities. Better known as an armed forces provost marshal - with its missions of common police, criminal investigation police for military matters, military traffic control police and intelligence police - it has been increasingly committed for all security roles in Lebanon, Haiti, Algeria, Bosnia, Cambodia, Kosovo for about twenty years and currently in the Ivory Coast. Thanks to its riot control culture, it provides a global, coherent

and specific answer to all the security issues that could occur in crisis areas. LO, criminal investigations, crowd control, VPs' (Vulnerable Points) protection, close protection, intelligence, counter-terrorism, and specialized commitments are representative examples of their action. In overseas theaters of operation, the gendarmerie appears to be a key and efficient player throughout crisis monitoring. Above all, a crisis transition tool from military management to civilian management, its status, its expertise, its projection rapid deployment capabilities grant it with a capability to operate efficiently within the whole range of crisis management.

Within the framework of the EU's foreign defense and security policies, the agreements signed by the fifteen in Feira (Portugal) in June 2000 sanctions the commitment of each country to provide **police forces in order to have a global commitment capability outside the EU** - including a rapid deployment capability. The national gendarmerie

provides 600 gendarmes (of whom 300 are rapidly deployable) and suggests the setting-up of a deployable headquarters, enabling France to command and control a police operation on EU request.

On the initiative of the Minister of Defense, a statement of intent was signed at Noordwijk (Netherlands) on September 17, 2004, by the Spanish, French, Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese Ministers of Defense pertaining to the setting-up of a **European gendarmerie force (EUROGENDFOR)**; it complements the available range of military assets for crisis management. This force - fitted with a standing and deployable headquarters and composed of units from member countries with gendarmerie-like forces - could deploy 800 troops rapidly; they include 300 French gendarmes able first and foremost to operate in the aftermath of armed forces in overseas theaters and subsequently to ease the transition towards a civilian management of crises.

**Conducting LO operations on the national territory or overseas requires expertise, professionalism, and in any case an outstanding coordination of all committed players; it also requires commanders to be fully aware of everyone's know-how and to respect everyone's role. In these conditions, optimized efficiency and credibility will best support France's objective regarding the global security concept.**




# The Role of the United States Army in Homeland Security

After a series of attacks against United States interests and military assets during the last 10 years and most notably those of September 11, 2001 the US Army has had a renewed emphasis placed on its missions to detect, deter, prevent, defeat and respond to threats and disasters in the homeland. The Army has not been directed to take such an active role in securing the homeland since World War II. During the post-war era, civil support activities remained an Army function, however, more emphasis was placed on other roles and functions, primarily warfighting, and The Army optimized its structure, doctrine and training to that end. **The current security environment has caused a reevaluation of Army doctrine and structures to ensure its ability to respond to threats to the homeland, other than overt conflict.**

BY COLONEL CHRISTOPHE GAYARD, CHIEF US LIAISON OFFICERS TEAM IN FRANCE

A secure homeland is fundamental to the interests of the United States. As we move into the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the homeland is confronted with a wide spectrum of threats ranging from traditional national security threats, such as ballistic missile attack, to law enforcement threats, such as drug smuggling. This conceptual spectrum has clear definitions on both ends but much less clarity in the middle where threats are neither clearly national security threats, the domain of the Department of Defense, (DOD) nor clearly law enforcement threats, which are the responsibility of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ) or other agencies. Because of the nature of this spectrum and the difficulty in identifying threats, no one agency is responsible for securing the homeland against all threats. **Thus, the US Army operates as a partner in this interagency and multi-jurisdictional environment.**





Maison Blanche - Paul Morse

President George W. Bush and guests applaud Secretary Michael Chertoff after he was sworn in as the second Secretary of Homeland Security Thursday, Mar. 3, 2005.

The Army conducts Homeland Security operations as part of a DOD effort in either a lead or support role. In a lead role - primarily Homeland Defense - DOD would have the primary responsibility for an operation. The Ground-Based Mid-Course Defense System (GBMCDS) is an example of an army operation in this role. In a support role - primarily Civil Support - The Army aids another agency. This category includes support to federal, state, or local agencies in circumstances that are or could be catastrophic in nature, such as mitigating the effects of a terrorist attack or natural disaster. This category also includes support missions that are routine in nature and limited in scope, such as support to National Security Special Events, such as the Olympics.

**Except in the case of homeland defense, DOD and thus The Army plays a supporting role to other federal civilian agencies** that are

the primary agents for the coordination and employment of US government support. Federal law provides the circumstances under which military personnel may be used for civilian law enforcement activities. It must be made clear, however, that DOD and thus Army support is meant to support and not to replace the civilian agencies, such as

law enforcement, which are active in homeland security.

All requests for support in the realm of homeland security are evaluated against the following criteria to determine if **the use of military forces is appropriate:**

- Legality (compliance with laws).
- Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DOD forces).
- Risk (safety of DOD forces).
- Cost (who pays, impact on budget).
- Appropriateness (whether the requested mission is proper and fitting for military participation).
- Readiness (impact on ability to perform other missions).
- Current laws and/or policies governing DOD intelligence collection and sharing of interagency information.

- Current statutes governing DOD domestic offensive information operations.

A general rule is that The Army provides support to other agencies on a last in, first out basis. That is to say that **The Army will provide support once an agency has exhausted all of its organic assets**, but once the mission requirement reduces, any Army assets will be among the first released from a particular operation.

The Army is optimized for warfighting and it has been a conscious choice not to create forces structured solely for operations in the homeland. Homeland Security remains the domain of other federal agencies. Thus, Homeland Security and Civil Support operations, while an integral part of The Army's missions, are not its primary mission. Therefore, **Army organizations must be tailorable for Homeland Security operations**, while remaining deployable for worldwide use in other missions through the full spectrum of operations. This requires units that are capable of providing support to multi-jurisdictional, federal, state and local governments and will probably require specific assets that are more predominant in combat support or combat service support units than in traditional combat units, for example assisting local authorities in response to a chemical or biological attack.

**Homeland security and operations interior to the United States are not the primary mission of the United**

**States Army. However, The Army does and will continue to have an important supporting role because of its**

**unique capabilities and expertise.**

# The United Kingdom: Military Assistance to Civil Authorities

Internal security in the United Kingdom is the responsibility of the Home Office. Its principal tools in conducting internal security operations are the police, supported by domestic intelligence services. **Under normal circumstances, the British Armed Forces have no formal role** in such scenarios. They exist for the defence of the realm and as a tool to be used in the pursuit of other national interests. Nonetheless, they can be used domestically and, **in very exceptional circumstances, they can be employed in internal security tasks.** To understand this more fully, it is worth examining the whole spectrum of situations in which the Armed Forces can support civil authorities. First, however, let us consider the attraction of employing Armed Forces in domestic situations and the principals and constraints on such a use.

BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL JW ROLLINS<sup>1</sup>, BRITISH LIAISON OFFICER TO CDEF AND CoFAT



British Army

The Armed Forces consist of well trained and disciplined men and women, many of whom have developed skills that are not exclusively military in their application. Physically fit and trained to apply lethal force if necessary, in extreme circumstances they may be useful in tackling armed and dangerous criminals, especially terrorists. They possess equipment that may well be suitable for a wide range of uses beyond those directly related to warfighting. Adaptable, resourceful and often highly trained in civilian recognised trades, servicemen and women can be deployed to maintain essential services. As well-motivated teams, military units are an obvious choice to assist the civilian population in times of disaster or emergency. **The Armed Forces are, therefore, potentially useful instruments of domestic policy in reserve, capable of dealing with a range of contingencies as required by HM Government.**



Importantly, despite their obvious utility, the use of the Armed Forces for domestic purposes is potentially controversial and strict limitations are placed on their domestic employment. The relationship between the Armed Forces and civil authorities in the UK is the subject of aspects of constitutional and administrative law and there has developed, over three hundred years, a legal doctrine governing the domestic use of military personnel. At the core of that doctrine is the absolute primacy of civil authorities; when Armed Forces' personnel are used on domestic tasks they are **only employed in support of relevant and legally responsible civil authorities**. A second principle of profound importance is that **Armed Forces' personnel at all times remain subject to the domestic law of the realm**, regardless of the task on which they are engaged. Those involved in providing assistance to civil authorities must be fully briefed as to their legal rights and obligations and the relationship they will have with the responsible civil authorities for which they are providing support. There are **three categories of Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA)** provided within the UK.

## Military Assistance to Government Departments

Military Assistance to Government Departments (MAGD) is the use of military personnel to provide essential services, including those that are being disrupted by industrial, or strike, action. Until recently, this element of MACA was known as Military Assistance to Civil Ministries and was concerned solely with the provision of essential services during industrial disputes. The recent change of title updates the terminology but also draws into the category provision of essential services in circumstances not exclusively related to industrial disputes. The main principles that are invariably applied during MAGD operations are:

- the Armed Forces are not to be used for 'strike-breaking' and;
- they are never, under any circumstances, to be armed.

## Military Assistance to the Civil Community

Military Assistance to the Civil Community (MACC) is any form of benign assistance provided to the community at large, either directly or at the request of the appropriate civil authorities, including other Government departments. It includes disaster relief and search and rescue operations. Routine assistance must not be provided in a manner that disadvantages those civilian contractors that might otherwise have benefited from the work undertaken by Armed Forces' personnel.

## Military Aid to the Civil Power

Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) is assistance provided for the purpose of law enforcement and internal security. Activities conducted under this heading may, in extreme circumstances, require Armed Forces' personnel to use force, including lethal force, if necessary. Examples of MACP include counter terrorism operations (including the long running deployment of military forces in Northern Ireland which is discussed in more detail below), drug interdiction and fishery protection. In most instances ashore, a principle invariably applied is that MACP operations are mounted only in exceptional circumstances, with military forces withdrawing as soon as the civil power is able to cope. MACP operations are therefore associated with law enforcement emergencies, with even the long-standing military involvement in Northern Ireland still being seen as an emergency involvement. At sea, however, the Royal Navy has long been involved in routine law enforcement operations, fishery protection being the longest running

continuous MACP operation in British military history. Although force is rarely necessary in this routine MACP operation, it is vital that the ability to use it is retained for extreme circumstances. When force is used in MACP operations, it is strictly in accordance with legal limitations and each individual serviceman and woman is personally obliged to comply with the law.

**Let us now look at counter terrorism and associated internal security duties in more depth.** Again, the most obvious case of the deployment of the Armed Forces on internal security duties is that of the British Army in Northern Ireland where it has been since 1969. What is important to understand in this case - as it would be in any other comparable circumstances - is that they were deployed in direct support of the police and under special legislation, namely the Emergency Powers Act. Indeed, such are the controls upon soldiers' conduct that some have been prosecuted for crimes up to and including murder committed in the course of carrying out their duties because strict rules of engagement or behaviour have not been properly applied. For example, one case involved the conviction for murder of a young soldier who continued to fire at a car that had been driven illegally through a road block. The rules say that such a vehicle can only be fired upon as long as it poses a threat to life. The moment this ceases to be the case - usually when the vehicle has passed the firer - firing must stop. It is often a case of fine judgement difficult for a frightened young soldier to apply. Yet apply judgement he must and failure to do so will incur the full impact of the law.

**In Northern Ireland**, operations are based on three major principles, namely:

- Pursual and, if suspected of possessing arms, munitions or explosives, arresting them and handing them over to the police within 4 hours. All actions to be



conducted with minimum force and within the constraints imposed by civil law.

- Daily patrolling and setting up of checkpoints to dissuade terrorist movement.
- Restoring confidence within the local population by being seen to protect them but without disrupting normal daily life.

Of course, apart from the particular case of fisheries protection, **Northern Ireland is the only example of a major and continued employment of the Forces in such a role.** Indeed, no such general deployment has taken place on the UK mainland. There have been a few, very rare, examples of small deployments in support of the police. However, again these have been in exceptional circumstances. They include the use of the Special Air Service (SAS) to rescue hostages. Again, such situations are a Home Office responsibility with the police as first choice of tool. Only as a last resort and then only on one occasion

has this happened. Furthermore, this might not be classed as an internal security situation, but rather a very specific counter terrorism task. A second example is the occasional use of bomb disposal assets. Again this is rare as the police now have their own such capability. Light armoured troops from one specific unit have been deployed in support of police around Heathrow, London's main airport, on more than one occasion. However, not only is this particular operation authorised and subsequently practiced under specific legal arrangements, it is not considered something of genuine military utility. It might be seen, rather, as something of a political gesture. It is difficult to think of any other circumstances in which troops might be deployed. Indeed, apart from 1926, when troops helped break up strikes, there has been no deployment in support of the police within the UK mainland. This is in spite of an often high terrorist threat. Indeed, the 1926 deployment was an exception - short-lived and something of a political disaster. Apart from a very isolated case in the early

19<sup>th</sup> century it is difficult to think of another such deployment since the creation of a standing army in Great Britain at the end of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

***In conclusion, therefore, military assets can be made available to support civil authorities when it is expedient to do so, however this is almost always in benign circumstances. In general terms, outside Northern Ireland, the British Armed Forces have almost no role in internal security.***

<sup>1</sup> LCL Rollins has commanded in Northern Ireland at platoon, company and battalion level.

## The Spanish Armed Forces

### in Support Missions for the Civilian Authorities (Public Order)

The armed forces are not allowed to fulfill public order specific missions on the national territory. This said, the present rules state that they can support the security forces (FCSE)<sup>1</sup> in performing their missions.

In the framework of missions taking place abroad, contingents sometimes face situations which compel them to get involved in crowd control missions ; which supposes that the units need to be flexible and to be equipped and trained to be able to manage this kind of situation at best.

BY LIEUTENANT-COLONEL FRANCISCO JAVIER HERNANDEZ ZARATIEGUI, SPANISH LIAISON OFFICER TO THE CDEF

The 1978 Spanish Constitution invests the armed forces (FA) with the mission of guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of Spain, of defending its territorial integrity and the constitutional order.

This mandate is materialized in the 6/1980 Law establishing the National Defence fundamental criteria and its organization; it specifies that the FA will carry out this mission by “protecting the life of the population and the interests of the country”.

The closest missions to those qualified as “ public order missions “ are to be found in the ones which, regularly, are performed “as direct support to the civilian authorities”

### Missions within the National Territory

At the request of the civilian authorities, the armed forces will be able to co-operate with them in the conditions covered by the law, in cases of serious risks, disasters, calamities or other similar public needs. These actions will be:

- co-operation ( for example, support to local sports events);

- collaborations : actions for the benefit of civilian organizations (FCSE specialization courses, agreements with universities, for example);
- operations of support to the civilian authorities.

The latter are those military actions which bring ad hoc support to the national civilian authorities or communities, when they are covered by the law and they are normally performed in the framework of unusual circumstances or when an emergency is past the capabilities of the civilian authorities. They generally have an emergency nature and most of the time request the use of whole units.

The **operations of support to the civilian authorities** can take on the form of:

- **environment and civilian protection operations;** they are undertaken following disasters of natural origin or caused by man such as earthquakes, floods, forests fires, pollution, etc (for example the shipwreck of the MV Prestige in 2002);
- **military support for the performance of operations;** this includes the selective mobilization of reservists, the planning and realization of operations to deploy forces and

civilian organizations on foreign territories (the earthquake in Turkey in 2002, the floods in Haiti in 2003, for example);

- **security and public order operations;** they include the use of military forces in support of government actions in order to contribute to maintain public order and security. The armed forces intervene depending on the needs expressed by the civilian administration and according to the law in effect.

During the last twenty-five years, successive governments thoroughly avoided involving the armed forces in the fight against terrorism and more concretely in the struggle against the ETA terrorist organization. Nevertheless, on some occasions, and with the authority of the law in effect, they resorted to the use of military forces to carry out various tasks because of that threat (cordonning off of the French-Spanish border in the 80s, protection of railways and sensitive facilities). We may also include in this framework the armed forces involvement in the Sevilla world fair and the 1992 Barcelona Olympic games as well as in the European Council meetings in Barcelona and Sevilla in 2002.





However, **the responsibility for the struggle against “internal” terrorism in Spain falls upon the FCSE. The FA involvement in this struggle will occur only upon request by the civilian power, exceptionnally and in support of the FCSE.**

The Spanish Defense White paper provides for the Spanish military forces to be employed in the struggle against international terrorism though it is stated that it must be “by completing surveillance or technical support tasks in accordance with their intrinsic capabilities”.

In December 2001, the Defense ministry signed a co-operation agreement with his Interior counterpart; it specifies that the FA can reinforce the Police and the Civilian Guard for searching, spotting, following and intercepting drug traffickers and smuggling networks, thanks to the use of military telecommunications and satellites. The agreement defines the “request principle”, a concept allowing the Interior ministry to coordinate the operations linked to drug trafficking which the FA take part in.

When dealing with the FA general missions and military actions, the last Defense strategic review worked out in Spain clearly stresses, in the part devoted to the mission of “collaboration with the other State institutions to preserve the security and well being of the citizens”, the possibility for the FA to co-operate with the FCSE in anti-terrorist actions. It also mentions the mission of “defending against an aggression against the security and the interests of the Spanish population or of allied countries”.

## The Missions Outside the National Territory

Among the missions falling on the Spanish FA outside their national territory in the performance of international agreements, the different deployed contingents can carry out zone controlling.

One of the actions performed by the units is “crowd control”<sup>2</sup>. Despite the fact that it is more police than military in nature, it is more and more executed during these operations.

At the moment of intervening, the units specialized in maintaining public order will always be the ones to act (Civilian Guard, Military Police, etc); **military units will limit themselves to cordon off the area and to support the specialized forces.**

In this case, units **are not allowed to take part in public order maintenance missions when planned in advance.** Spanish contingents will respect the national restrictions in all circumstances and will apply the ROEs<sup>3</sup> in effect in each theatre.

In these missions, the rules of engagement must be coherent with the political mandate and the use of the armed forces must take into account the whole set of conditions for the use of force. In that case, the military units intervene:

- with their staff and under the command of their acting commanders;
- equipped with means adapted to the mission and with the necessary individual and collective protection;
- by systematically using force in a progressive and proportionate way;

the use of lethal force will be conditioned by the principles of proportionality and self-defence.

The different contingents organize and equip their different platoon level units to intervene in these missions if need be. The components of the unit are then fielded equipment specific to public order maintenance (helmet, elbow protection, gloves, bulletproof jacket, individual defence, handcuffs, shield, anti-riot gun). The movement to the incident area is performed with the most adapted means of conveyance, transport under armor not being mandatory.

**As a conclusion,** armed forces participation in public order missions whether inside or outside the national territory is subject to regulations reviews and draftings because of the important changes occurring presently.

**The public order missions performed by the FA on the national territory will always be carried out at the request of the corresponding civilian authorities.** Generally speaking they will concern the protection of facilities or sensitive or important locations, the protection of lines of communication, the support to public order maintenance (in that case, exceptionnally and in support of the FCSE), and the support to mobilization.

**In this type of missions conducted abroad, Spain does not allow its units to take part to missions planned in advance.** Anyway they must be equipped to be employed if the development of the situation necessitates their intervention in the framework of a crowd control mission.

<sup>1</sup> FCSE: State security Corps and Forces; these are the Spanish security forces encompassing the national Police, the civilian Guard (equivalent to the Gendarmerie), the police of autonomous regions, and the municipal police.

<sup>2</sup> Note: Reminder : Spanish “crowd control” does not convey the same meaning as in the French armed forces.

<sup>3</sup> ROE: Rules Of Engagement.

## The Employment Policy of Armed Forces within the Framework of Protection

The “protection” strategic function has significantly changed since the last decade. From territorial general defense we have switched to a search for a “global security” for the entire society. The armed forces have adapted themselves in accordance with the demands expressed by the administrative authorities responsible for this security.

This resulted in an inflation of missions, whilst the size of forces (with the exception of the Gendarmerie<sup>1</sup>) has decreased, leading to an increasing unavailability of men and equipment.

**Therefore, this raises the question of an employment policy for the armed forces integrating those evolutions and taking advantage of two strong points of the institution:** the ability of organizing and conducting complex operations in a degraded environment, which could be used as a model by other administrations in charge of security; the *ultima ratio* entailed by the capabilities of forces when other assets are overwhelmed.

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BY MAJOR (R) JEAN-JACQUES PATRY, RESEARCH PROFESSOR AT THE FRENCH STRATEGIC RESEARCH FOUNDATION (FRS)

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### A Protection Function in the Process of Demilitarization

The general organization of defense, in place since 1959, consisted in shielding the institutions warranting the deterrence maneuver and territorial integrity from an internal or external militarized aggression (infiltration or sabotage), by implementing defense plans prepared by a responsible ministerial authority. Protection included the installations of each service ensuring the continuity of land, air, sea defense missions, and then that of key governmental and vital points for which the Army had dedicated reserves, now gone. Protection could therefore be technically defined as a *“set of measures, active or passive aimed at denying or lessening the occurrence of malevolent or aggressive actions against sensitive persons, locations or equipment”*.

#### Several strong trends have changed it:

- **an accumulation of “asymmetrical” risks and threats** (WMDs, ballistic missiles, organized crime, terrorism, attacks on property, clandestine immigration, natural and industrial disasters, etc.) some of which do not fall under the military domain;
- **an overlap of decisional levels** exceeding the national framework (regional level - EU, NATO and international - UN, OSCE, etc.);

- **addition of other fields: warning, assistance, aid**, due to the likely effects of mass terrorism or natural or industrial disasters.

#### Each service somehow adapted itself.

The Gendarmerie has well negotiated this evolution as protection falls within the scope of its main permanent missions. Its budgets have been preserved.

The Air Force re-focused on air security and defense against non-military intrusions. The Navy developed the “maritime safeguard”, in order to manage at best the assets it could employ for “protection/defense of approaches” and “state actions at sea” missions.

**The Army**, deeply involved in the various PIRATE<sup>2</sup> plans, has provided men and equipment, whilst its reserves were disbanded or reduced. It has been necessary to create the PROTERRE detachments, in order to maintain a minimally coherent management of personnel and know-how of personnel torn between intervention and internal protection missions.

These adaptations have been carried out simultaneously with a “mutualization” of assets with the joint defense territorial organization (May 26 2000 decree). A few agreements between the Armed Forces General Staff and various

ministries (Transport, Interior) have rationalized the requests for help for the fight against forest fires, the NRBC risk, and assistance in case of air crashes.

However, **the present definition of the protection<sup>3</sup> function continues to raise issues.** This latter takes the size of a general security policy whose responsibility it seems to give to the military, whilst its content falls under, in most cases, the responsibility of the ministry of the interior.

## The Aims of an Employment Policy for the Forces

In order to counter the evoked dangers, “global security” encompasses activities such as watch, prevention and answers to aggressions (assistance and retaliation) in addition to protection. It must be permanent, thanks to a constant ability to combine all above quoted activities, with no organizational disruption, even in case of extreme crisis.

**The objective of a joint policy for the employment of forces** should therefore consist in clearly defining what falls under the military services in the framework of the global security inter-ministry cycle. Indeed, the forces are present for various accounts in all the functions this cycle has.

- **Intelligence on threats.** Today, the military assets are routinely called upon in support of civilian needs (case of the AZF terrorist group). They could now be organized in order to ensure the “tracking” of certain asymmetrical threats whether close or far from the national territory.
- **Numerous ministries cover the information pertaining to our vulnerabilities.** But a national analysis capability of vulnerabilities is still lacking. The competences of the armed forces in the field of territory operational defense and in

the systemic analysis for targeting would be useful to support its creation within an institution such as the National Defense General Secretary (SGDN).

- **The prevention of risks** essentially belongs to the ministry of the interior. It is composed of **risk assessments** activities pertaining to infrastructures, given to the Civilian Security and Defense Direction. This latter organization tries to build an inter-ministry crisis management body ensuring similar activities as those carried out by the Operational Coordination and Planning Centre (CPCO) for military operations. The protection measures of sensitive points are the second component of preventive measures. They partly fall under the responsibility of the defense district joint staffs that must prepare plans with other administrative or civilian society players. In both cases the military know-hows should be proposed as models to be reproduced.
- The **assistance field** is shared between the civilian security from the ministry of the interior, the health ministry and the defense ministry units equipped to fight NRBC and fires. The organization of common exercises is essential in order to familiarize everyone with the procedures and the equipment employment doctrines during crisis contingencies.
- Last, **defense** is the last link of global security and the armed forces are the main players, especially as far as measures pertaining to attacks from abroad or the implementation of retaliation actions are concerned.

*1 Translator's note: the Gendarmerie is a French military force responsible for police and also military missions.*

*2 Translator's note: PIRATE: security plans against possible terrorist actions.*

*3 What should be the Military Global Security for the defense policy for France ? Joint Staff, March 15, 2003.*

**To conclude, although the armed forces have adapted themselves to the rising post-cold war dangers, their place in the general organization of security is not sufficiently recognized.** They should appear as a source of expertise in key fields of organization and coordinated action in a complex situation, and not only as a reservoir of assets open to all, depending on the circumstances.

As although the involved administration parties in global security are well accustomed to ordinary prevention, rescue or assistance missions, a significantly lower number of them are ready to face deep crisis contingencies.

**Therefore, the optimization of the joint participation to the global security cycle would entail the definition of a structured employment policy** stressing on the one hand the contributions and capabilities in areas such as watch, alert, prevention, assistance (on top of protection) against the new dangers; and on the other clearly showing the limits of these contributions.



## Armed Forces and Homeland Security Missions

The armed forces have largely increased public service missions in the last few years, adding to the **controversy regarding the use of the military in carrying out LO (Law & Order) missions in the future.** Indeed, from everyday delinquency to major events such as the G8 in Evian or World Trade Organization meetings, political decision makers are tempted to meet terrorist, technological, climatic and bacteriological (etc...) hazards - that our modern democracies face - with an ever stronger answer. This thinking about the country's global security gathers both police agencies and the newly all-volunteered forces. For this purpose, the armed forces appear to be more and more committed alongside conventional police forces in order to set up a permanent presence in railway stations, in airports, or in the vicinity of sensitive buildings (for example nuclear facilities). In this context, police agencies (French national police forces, French Gendarmerie) fear that a more systematic commitment of armed forces would gradually result in the militarization of LO missions since the 1995 terrorist attacks and the hazardous threats that have been hanging over France since 09/11. This debate is murky and gives free rein to corporatist competition.

BY MONSIEUR THIERRY NOGUES, RENNES 2 UNIVERSITY

We are going to deal with this issue based on the results of a survey<sup>2</sup> conducted in 2001 for the Defense Center for social science study. Its purpose was about an answer to be found to both following questions: **what could be the role played by the armed forces and specifically by the Army for LO missions on the home territory?** A way to provide an answer consisted

in wondering whether newly all-volunteered forces may get committed into LO missions ; and whether they should do it. To some extent, officers working within our SC (Steering Committee) on behalf of the French Army guided our question setting by examining "a possibility to commit soldiers into hot suburbs to aid police forces, should the situation deteriorate" - to use their own words. Currently, LO operations on which we focused only deal with one chapter of homeland security.



ADJ DRAHI/SIRPA TERRE

### Could the French Army get Committed to Aid in LO missions in France ?

There are two ways to answer this question. In the first meaning of the word, it seemed essential to examine first whether it is possible to get the armed forces committed as a preventive measure or as a repressive measure. Two legal texts underlie the commitment of the different categories of forces on homeland territory: it is the matter

of ordinance Nr 59-147 dated January 7, 1959 and of ministerial directive Nr 500 dated May 9, 1995 about the commitment of armed forces for LO operations. But we could also mention various updated - in particular in 1993 - global protection plans.

Though the LO concept as defined - among others - by ministerial directive Nr 500 is relatively accurate, it has nevertheless several meanings; the most common one defines the environment within which specialized police forces are committed (riot control Gendarmerie; riot police companies). In article 1, ministerial directive Nr 500 defines LO as “aiming at preventing disturbances in order not to have to put them down. Above all, it includes preventive measures, whose significance should never be forgotten. If disturbances occur however, it also includes dispositions to restore order”. **LO, a civilian defense mission, comes under the civilian authority** (article 2), responsible for planning and implementing adequate measures. “Whatever these measures are - preventive or intervention measures - the civilian authority can only set military authorities in motion in compliance with a requisition” (article 3). “Preventive measures pertain to all the measures that can be taken in order to prevent any disorder. They also aim at protecting general interest facilities and routes” (article 4). “Intervention measures result in the deployment of police forces, according to specific plans and techniques aimed at monitoring, keeping, screening or temporarily denying people’s freedom of movement within specific areas”. “Should it be necessary, these measures can include the use of force with or without any weapons. (But) the deployed force should be proportional to the disorders to be quelled; it should end when disorders are over” (article 5).

In this day and age, the armed forces supplement police forces already committed and thus reinforce an existing system considered to be inadequate. In this case, they are discipline and force reservoirs that can be mobilized more rapidly than other administrations; however, their combat capabilities are not a selection criteria<sup>3</sup>. Within the specific framework of aid request, “homeland security” missions are not purely military missions because the underlying logic is not oriented towards - defensive or offensive - operations; it does not anticipate the use of weapons and thus opening fire<sup>4</sup>.

Thus, committing the armed forces because of their combat capabilities cannot fall within the scope of “Vigipirate” operations. On the other


hand, in case of confirmed uprising, riots and widespread violence in one or several places of homeland territory, the ordinance dated January 7, 1959 (articles 4, 5 and 6) anticipates **the possible use of armed forces**. So far, it never occurred; it still has an exceptional character. So the review of official texts appears to end debates pertaining to an increased commitment of soldiers towards LO. It clearly sets the conditions for the requisitioning of armed forces and thus restricts their commitment.

## Should we Have the Army Committed for LO Missions ?

Eventually, the heart of the matter is about the issue of legitimacy of action and about the expertise of soldiers as regards LO operations in and outside France. We must not forget the specific aspect of a military profession; most of the militaries and lawmakers remain attached to it<sup>5</sup>.

The increased commitment of the Army for “**homeland security**” or more specifically LO missions compels us to review lessons from history; it is considered by some people as a possible mission owing to what is observed in some major towns’ “hot” suburban areas or by others as a “fantasy” against which we have to be protected. Carried out interviews stress the fact **that we should not forget that the apportionment of forces in three different categories results from history; it led to the setting up of specialized LO forces (2<sup>nd</sup> category forces)**. These forces gradually set up knowledge and a very specific expertise (self-control in particular) different from the Army military culture. Therefore, LO missions could not be limited to “crowd control”, as carried out in Kosovo between 1999 and 2001 or in the Ivory Coast more recently.

One of the major obstacles to commit military (Army) forces<sup>6</sup> to the benefit of homeland security sends us back to the various foundations and principles on which the Army’s contemporary professional culture is built. During the basic training phase of soldiers, reactions were created and even incorporated, so that infantrymen make use of their combatant’s skills in extreme situations along the border or beyond homeland territory. For a half century, the Army hardly took part in LO operations and LO prevention and only for back-up duties. Linking or amalgamating security<sup>7</sup> operations carried out by the Army in Kosovo and LO operations in



ADJ DRAHI/SIRPA TERRE

France would be particularly detrimental to democracy. Regarding the use of force by military forces, politicians have to remind us of the thresholds not to be passed over. Because **the Army is the only force to be able to implement the use of force in a potentially unlimited way; it theoretically sets it apart from agencies more specifically tasked to carry out homeland LO operations<sup>8</sup>.**

Eventually, the Army enjoys a good (83 %) <sup>9</sup> satisfaction rate, linked to its new out-of-area and overseas missions and especially to their highly covered humanitarian components. In spite of heterogeneous addresses pertaining to the validity of aiding in homeland LO operations, our survey confirms that the **Army is not likely to jeopardize this confidence and esteem** by exposing itself to controversies; in case of serious incidents, controversies could be sparked by the media in an even less favorable manner than they did in some recent overseas theaters such as the Ivory Coast.

<sup>1</sup> The author currently teaches at the Rennes 2 University. He is also responsible for a firm pertaining to research and action (ATOS - Sociological observation workshop), in particular dealing with Defense issues and contemporary matters linked to work force management within firms. The expert team that he monitors more specifically favors on-the-job observations in operation theaters where workers with a military status operate. His latest surveys deal with jointness situations in Kosovo and Bosnia. The team's current works deal with the future of provost marshal missions as well as the different military identities within the four Services.

<sup>2</sup> NOGUES Thierry, CHEVRIER Stéphane, SAUVAGE André (dir.), *Armed forces and homeland security. The perception of military and civilian institutional players*. LARES - Rennes 2 University - C2SD, May 2001.

<sup>3</sup> BIGO Didier, HANON Jean-Paul, TSOUKALA Anastassia, 1998, Id., mentioned book, page 6/12 of the summary.

<sup>4</sup> With the exception of confirmed self-defense.

<sup>5</sup> See: Recent thoughts about the overall military status.

<sup>6</sup> BRODEUR Jean-Paul, "Police forces and military forces" in *Public ethic (Éthique publique)*, vol. 2, Nr 1, 2000, pages 157-166.

<sup>7</sup> In particular, Army soldiers mention "crowd control" (French FM TTA 950) to describe their commitment's framework; should things get out of their hands, they could return fire with their automatic rifles.

<sup>8</sup> BOËNE Bernard (dir.), *Military specific aspects*, Paris, ARMAND Colin, 1988.

<sup>9</sup> See the latest survey carried out by the French SOD public relation directorate.



# Rediscovering the “Treatise on Public Force”?

Why should we revive the *Treatise on Public Force*, already published two centuries ago in 1790, the very year its author, Count de Guibert, passed away? Son of the Age of Enlightenment and born in Montauban on November 11, 1743, he died at the age of 47 after an unusual military, literary, and political life. He was a member of the French Academy and a general.

First, political culture requires us to know this work, less studied than the *General Essay on Tactics*<sup>1</sup> but just as fundamental. The *Essay* was a break with military thinking. Ahead of his time, Guibert was the theorist of the profound “revolution in military thinking” during the end of the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century. This revolution, leading to the “modern war system,” still prevails today despite the changes in technologies. Twenty years after publication of this foundation work, the *Treatise on Public Force* has been to general thinking on the defense of a modern democratic nation what the *Essay* has been for the evolution of operational art: a major founding contribution.

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BY BRIGADIER GENERAL VINCENT DESPORTES, DEFENSE ADVISOR TO THE DEFENSE SECRETARY GENERAL

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The *Treatise* justifies rediscovery in and of itself, containing as it does remarkable ideas of unquestionable modern inspiration. Guibert’s legacy as a visionary in the *Treatise* is undoubtedly one of the milestones of political thinking. Before all others, two years before the war between peoples, new ideas and nationalisms began its long quarter-century procession across Europe, Guibert predicted the advent of the mass wars and unlimited conflicts that would turn the XIX<sup>th</sup> and the XX<sup>th</sup> centuries upside down. Dealing with the issue of defense as a whole, concerned by the global aspect of the dangers that can threaten it, he presented an original vision of relationships between the army and the nation for a new, national, and citizen’s France. He proposed an ideal organization for a “public” national armed force versus that of the sovereign, cementing the public liberty of a large democratic country.



Theorizing on the use of legitimate violence by the nation facing internal as well as external threats, Guibert was inspired by an innovative perception of the necessary moral consistency of the social body facing issues of national and international relations. In his vision, the army was no longer the tool of absolutism, but the heart and soul of a France renewed. Breaking with technical considerations, which were at this point the basis of military thinking, Guibert deliberately directed his thoughts to the heart of the relationship between the nation and its military force. This military force, whose cost must be compatible with public spending, for him became the foundation of liberty as well as its warden, both inside - as it must enforce laws - and outside - as it must deter and counter aggression. The public force was split into two distinct elements: the “outside force” was responsible for border defense,

<sup>1</sup> This work has just been republished by *ECONOMICA* (September 2004), with a foreword written by Lieutenant General Thomann, Land Forces Commander.

but also “deployable” (as *“hostilities between great peoples can take place at all four corners of the world”*) and the “inside force” responsible for public order. The creation of the National Guard as early as 1791 was the first implementation of his recommendations. One remarks that the National Guard is still alive in the United States of America under the name given it by the Marquis de La Fayette on the other side of the Atlantic. France had to wait until 1796, after the end of the “war of peoples” he both predicted and feared, for the decision to create a permanent regular army made up of volunteers subject to certain “judicial limits” that he called his vows. The present French system, with its “outside forces” made up of voluntary enlisted personnel, its “inside forces,” and its system of constabularies and police, remains Guibert’s direct heir.

The desired separation of operational and organic powers has existed for a long time. According to Guibert, protection of public liberty required that operational power on one hand and the authority to levy and organize forces on the other

would clearly be separate. The executive power fulfils the first function; the legislative fulfils the second as *“such major interests of the nation, one consisting in its safety, and the other deriving from the settling of its dearest responsibilities, can only be decided upon by it.”* In his reasoning, military power depends upon political power, thus averting despotism. As far as militias are concerned, they must form a wall against any threat to public liberty and answer first to the legislative power, which mutatis mutandis is not extraneous to the procedures that today govern the employment of armed forces on national territory.



Far from sticking to a strict plan for the employment of the “outside” forces and “inside” forces, Guibert was also exceptionally germane when he envisaged “according to contingencies,” to use troops on national territory. This use only when absolutely necessary and when its efficiency, according to its characteristics (capability in today’s terms), make it an indispensable complement to the “inside forces.” According to Guibert, *“the two forces must be gathered when their combination can more easily settle troubles.”* Did he already sense our present crisis environment where terrorist operations and asymmetrical activities replace capability arguments with effects arguments ?

Did he picture a day when classic methods for mastering conflict, the rational logic of war favoring the efficiency of destructive technology, would give way to dull environments entailing new combinations of political, diplomatic, social, and military actions ? Probably not, but he might have sensed a day would come when new forms of violence would require the police and armed forces complement each other, thus giving back to men - the man in the field, in true contact with reality - the essential place that capability logic and technological escalation had blurred in cold war mentality.

# Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in Time of Crisis: Lessons Learned from Gard River Floods in 2002 and 2003

Today, Nîmes is the second largest French joint garrison after Paris.

Thus, the link between the armed forces and the civilian society is traditionally very strong.

The large attendance of Nîmes inhabitants during patriotic ceremonies shows their strong link towards military units located in the Gard County.

As the third Nîmes employer - after the town and the state-run hospital - the armed forces are an important component for the economic and social life in the county.

The armed forces are also an inescapable actor for local authorities regarding town and country planning and environmental protection policies because of its land reserves. Indeed, the Garrigues camp stretches over 5,000 hectares. In compliance with its operational requirements and the environment, the armed forces managed to make the required propositions in order to enable the road development of the Nîmes area's northern ring road, on the southern outskirts of the camp.

Beyond these examples, I would like to give you a detailed account of **the lessons learned after the September 2002 and December 2003 major floods.**

The first instance resulted into a very heavy death toll with 22 dead, 95 % of the county damaged (299 districts), which led to losses amounting to 300 million euros.

On a smaller scale (encompassing 37 districts), December 2003 floods required 11,000 people to be relocated and resulted in losses amounting to 300 million euros.

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BY PREFECT JEAN-PIERRE HUGUES, GARD PREFECT

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**Both these exceptional crises highlighted the decisive role carried out by the armed forces during the crisis' acute phase, thanks to their mobilization and projection capabilities at very short notice.**

In my briefing, I will first deal with the strong points in the task carried out by the armed forces and then comment on resulting lessons learned.

## CIMIC

1,437 personnel (soldiers, Civil Emergency , Operating and Training Unit's personnel and gendarmes) took part in rescue operations in September 2002; and augmentations forces should be added to them (gendarmerie companies - 500 personnel). In December 2003, 1,062 armed forces personnel and gendarmes took part in these operations.

### **Exceptional assets adapted to exceptional situations**

The Gard is particularly well equipped as regards armed forces (6<sup>th</sup> light armored brigade: 6,600

personnel; Naval Air Station (NAS); 1,300 personnel).

So, the subsequent developments should be analyzed in light of the military assets available in Gard. The commitment of the 6<sup>th</sup> light armored brigade's heavy equipment and the military units attached to the Civil Emergency Services (UIISC) allowed it to carry out over 2,000 evacuations in September 2002 and 500 in December 2003, in particular thanks to wheeled armored vehicles; 3 of them were swept along by water in 2002. Military barracks (Garrigues camp, Naval Air station - NAS) were used to accommodate displaced people. Their logistic organization is the only one capable of providing full accommodation capabilities (bedding, food, clothes).

Military units also took part in surveillance and protection missions in evacuated areas (11,000 people evacuated in December 2003) to avoid the looting of houses. This action appeared to be decisive to comfort the populations deeply stricken by misfortune and to stop rampage rumors outright.



## **High level engineering and initiative capabilities**

The coordination and control of helicopters carried out by the Nîmes-Garons Naval Air Station in September 2002 was particularly noticed. An inspection mission was carried out by Mr. Philippe Huet, a government general inspector, who wrote in his report: "On his own initiative, the Naval Air Station Commander had a Bréguet taken off to monitor the helicopter (9) activity; these helicopters were military and civilian (emergency services) helicopters, which could not communicate between each other. The civilian population was likely to owe a lot to them."

1,260 heliborne rescues were carried out thanks to the military, fire-brigade and civilian emergency service helicopters. To find such an extended operation again, we have to go back to February 1, 1953, within the framework of floods in the Netherlands. I would like to stress the specific role of the county military representative, who played a pivotal and decisive role in CIMIC. A battle-seasoned officer in overseas theatres, accustomed to extremely urgent situations, he is a key figure in civilian emergency crises. Adapting the experience of military crisis management to civilian emergency crises is a huge asset - among others in anticipating capabilities. His prospective analyses enable him to have a profitable dialogue with the asset-providing authorities (local or national levels).

## **Lessons Learned from CIMIC**

### **A co-operation that should be carried out beforehand**

Taking part in civilian emergency crisis management cannot be improvised by the armed forces. To this purpose, CIMIC co-operation should be carried out well ahead of the occurrence of crisis situations; it should be carried out as early as emergency planning and it is a condition to succeed. These different stages - thinking, answer drafting to meet emergency situations - build knowledge of people, of procedures, and of crisis management centers. Thus, it is a basic factor, contributing to linking multidisciplinary teams which, will be coordinated by the prefect, should an emergency situation occur.

As the county is highly vulnerable to natural disasters, the prefect's Defense Operation Center is mobilized very often, to monitor lower-level situations. Simulation exercises are often set up, either by the military authority or by the civilian authority; they enable an exchange between different cultures and a better knowledge of the different players, which will save time in actual situations.

In the Gard County, I notice that this co-operation among players was carried out very intensively; the general commanding the 6<sup>th</sup> Light Armored Brigade actively takes part in Defense Operation Center meetings and in in-the-field inspections.

### **It is required to accurately separate out the mobilization and the allotment of military assets**

The very strong initiative capability of the armed forces enables the civilian authority to make quick decisions.

For this purpose, the prefect has to accurately delineate the missions tasked to the armed forces. They should only be committed **for missions where their assets, or their technical expertise have no equivalent in the civilian society - in terms of quality or availability.**

Thus, missions tasked to military units should be limited in time. Indeed, the armed forces should not take part in operations that can be carried out with normal civilian assets (for instance, I think of house cleaning operations).

These principles should be reiterated in the early stages of a crisis, as the myth of conscript armed forces being tasked to carry out commonplace logistic tasks dies hard.

### **The example of the organization of military chains of command for civilian authorities**

The functional organization of military command elements - which are no longer segmented and structured - should be an inspiration to organize civilian crisis cells. The very important distinction between the monitoring of an event and its analysis, developed by the armed forces, should be **an inspiration to set up crisis cells monitored by civilian authorities.**

J.C. Skaff & C. Hiebler  
SERVICE AUDIOVISUEL SDIS 30



# The Role of the Armed Forces in the Struggle Against Terrorism

Numerous experts foresee terrorism multiplying in the years to come. Most of our allies have made the anti-terrorist struggle a national priority and, to varying degrees, have committed their military to it. **What, then, is the French strategy on this matter?**

By MAJOR NICOLAS BRENGUES, STUDENT, 12<sup>TH</sup> CID

## September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001, the “Great Leap Forward”

Up until September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 the vast majority of strategic pundits downplayed the risk of terror. Today, many of them are outdoing each other's pessimism. They herald the advent of an era of asymmetric wars that, according to François Heisbourg, will last thirty years. Wars where western civilization lies in hard opposition to various factions. Accepting this analysis, which comes as timely backlash, seems simplistic, but denying further progression of events would be blameworthy.

Despite the efforts by Ben Laden and his accomplices to impose it on the entire *Oumma*, *Salafism* remains outside mainstream Islam. Other radical concepts of Islam vie with it. Notwithstanding predictions by Samuel Huntington and Benjamin Barber, the rallying of hundreds of millions of moderate Muslims is clearly not imminent.

Without falling prey to “the sky is falling” mentality inspired by some factions, one must admit two facts:

- the same Muslims or other political factions will certainly perpetuate these type of attacks again,
- this new, more global, more lethal, more strategic terrorism, is departing from its usual rationale.

Therefore, terrorism no longer falls under the sole jurisdiction of law enforcement agencies. In fact, it constitutes a veritable upheaval in international relations.

It is too early to try to measure the success of this modern terrorism in the long term, even if Alexandre Adler has already, not without ulterior

motives, “seen the end of the ancient world.” There is probably a limit to savagery just as to cowardice. Beyond this limit the “hyper-terrorists” will not be able to go without undermining their very relative legitimacy. Nevertheless, the birth of a feeling of fear among Westerners and the increasing spreading of Islamic propaganda constitute two intermediate successes that will encourage these extremists to continue.

## The Armed Forces Involved in Many Arenas

Since the 90s, the three military services in France have been closely associated with the anti-terrorist priorities of security services. Despite its commendable interaction at start, this interagency cooperation did not grow.

The strategic choices of our allies might call us into question. Our allies, and not just those across the Atlantic, are studying different levels of military engagement in the struggle against terrorism. If nothing else, they all share the notion that the armed forces must participate either in action or at least in concept. This trend will surely grow stronger since NATO made the decision to take on the struggle against terrorism.

A country does not derive its defense policy from abroad, but in France the friction between the strategic role of the armed forces and the needs expressed by its public is striking. Taxpayers wonder about the necessity for some military spending while polls suggest that terrorism constitutes their first security concern if not the only. This apparent gap is all the more surprising, as the cause seems to reside at the strategic level. Whatever some great minds may think, the necessity to keep prepared for a high intensity conflict against a conventional enemy, whether





equipped with nuclear weapons or not, remains an absolute imperative. Taking into account its present manifestation, however, **terrorism is now also threatening the vital, strategic interests of France as a power. Defending these interests is the *raison d'être* of the armed forces as defined by the Constitution.**

In a similar vein, terrorist attacks are increasing in all countries at war. Proving thus that terrorism is tactically an acceptable course of action likely to be experienced in all modern conflicts. The attack against the shipyard directorate personnel in Karachi finally demonstrates that national defense, as a whole, is a target; its civilian industrial component included, and not only in countries openly at war.

## Numerous Paths

**We must be aware of one thing: “terrorist prehistory” is finished. The spread of terrorism cannot be explained simply by its low cost; it stresses the success of a concept that skillfully exploits some weaknesses of democratic societies. The impact of the media enables the terrorist, by virtue of a few victims, to take a whole population hostage. Up until this point, the infinite number of targets and of potential methods gave an**

**unequaled volatility to the threat, increasing tenfold in the future by considerable funding. The permanent harassment strategy of revolutionary guerillas finds new application of worldwide nature.**

This technique is clever and its dangers numerous. We must be careful not to sink into **defeatism** by considering terrorism as a modern, elusive, and disembodied misfortune. On the other hand, we must also beware of the **wild goose chase** of always looking for a way of handling the previous attack. Only calm observation neither alarmist nor simplistic is likely to lead to an efficient reaction, aimed at the decisive weaknesses of the terrorists themselves (funding networks, training camps, hideouts, simplistic propaganda, and internal disputes).

Moreover, to be worth it, the investment cannot be limited to the action of a few dedicated services. It must be accompanied by effects **at all levels of public action** such as in bilateral relations with states guilty of ineffectiveness or complaisance toward terrorists.

The struggle against terrorism also requires an evolution of thinking: **communication** constitutes a major universal investment since public opinion is at the core of terrorist acts. So media attention, always quick to embrace just causes, must beware



of the risk of being used as instruments. Far from any censorship, the goal would be to encourage it to handle images with care and to mistrust a too often manipulated gibberish in which charia conceals a Saudi conception of the state, or *mujahedin* elevates the mission of the poor creature guarding the poppy fields in Afghanistan. Similarly it is time to enlighten those French populations most susceptible to propaganda. If Islam is indeed interested in European Muslims, it is primarily to recruit potential martyrs with a high symbolic value who are, moreover, totally free to move throughout Europe. Beyond this opportunistic manipulation, their mentors remain convinced that the young people from the *Maghreb* in the suburbs are definitely corrupted by the Western way of life.

Since it concerns **national security** as a whole, it seems indispensable to create mixed agencies within which joint actions by policemen and the military would be rethought - and not only coordinated. These entities might notably, before the advent of an unfortunate incident, study the legality of soldier participation in police tasks within the *Vigipirate* framework.

As for the **armed forces**, this process would require a thorough reassessment of the strategic situation, taking into account both other priorities and limited resources, in order to confirm or invalidate present priorities, particularly in budgets.

The **Army**, which is first to be committed, cannot be satisfied with the status quo. Ground forces must reexamine the way they conduct missions in France and abroad in the light of terrorist constraints. For units that are naturally used to engagements in a hostile environment this risk does not, in itself, constitute a revolution. However, area control operations, installation of checkpoints, the defense of sensitive locations, as well as all the active and passive security measures are destined to be reworked more or less. These adjustments might apply in all contexts of engagement. They concern infinite related subjects such as the mission of the defense attaches, the role of Special Forces, the fielding of new equipment, etc.

## Overcautious Armed Forces

One may object that budgetary rigor and the task list of the armed forces prevent consideration of a whole new set of missions, especially since its implementation probably requires **intergovernmental cooperation**, traditionally not the strong point of the French executive.

France's history reminds us, however, that with regard to national security a mere lack of reactivity by the armed forces may go down in history as a reprehensible **wait-and-see policy**. Let us admit it would be rather difficult to explain why in 2004, the French armed forces do not possess a doctrine clearly defining its forces share, however small, in the struggle against terrorism, particularly since imaginable military actions are varied and modular: capture or neutralization of terrorists, destruction of their infrastructure, and assistance to requesting countries.

The pitfalls of hasty engagement in the struggle against terrorism are also very real. The **ad hoc measures** already taken by the armed forces (surveillance of coastal or airspace approaches, and localized engagement of special forces in Afghanistan), implemented by the whim of circumstance, do not constitute an anti-terrorist strategy. Similarly, disguising military operations as, "preventive actions to guarantee lasting development" do not automatically transform them into appropriate responses to the plague of terrorism. Concerning the alleged relation between poverty and terrorism, it is enough to note that twelve of the nineteen terrorists of September 11<sup>th</sup> were citizens of Saudi Arabia, an underdeveloped country in many aspects, but that surely does not meet the definition of an impoverished state<sup>1</sup>.

*1 After WW II, in the USA, poverty was presented as the compost for communism in order to lead the American Congressmen to vote the Marshall plan funds.*

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Above all, France's **special historic and demographic relationship to Islam** forbids blind copying of foreign anti-terrorist strategy. Its six million French Muslims require us to treat this phenomenon with more subtlety; probably offering us unrecognized possibilities of success.

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# lessons learned

## LO (Law & Order) and PSO (Peace Support Operations)

*The 3<sup>rd</sup> mechanized brigade was the core of KFOR's BMNE (Multinational Brigade North-East) (Kosovo) when unexpected and violent events broke out in March 2004. To meet this threat - within the framework of its PSO mission - it implemented **three complementary COAs (Courses of Action) (interposition, COIN (Counterinsurgency), deterrence) pertaining to LO operations**. The way events evolved led to use each COA in turn.*

*Before the March riots, KFOR was operating within a crisis outcome environment. To support the return to normality, the armed forces gradually handed over their leading role to police forces, which had to show - in particular to the population - the advantage of having LO restored to live in peace at last.*

*The restoration of a suddenly deteriorated situation came from the individual and collective capability to change postures very quickly (reversibility), shifting from the merely reassuring role of a token force to tough riot control operations by relieving a suddenly overwhelmed police force. As soon as it was quiet again, we had to chase troublemakers; the legal admissibility for their accusation was an imperative requirement. Simultaneously, shows of force and shows of presence were intended to prevent any further disorders.*

BY GENERAL XAVIER MICHEL, COMMANDING THE 3<sup>RD</sup> MECHANIZED BRIGADE

If all three COAs are interconnected, **we should organize the conduct of such mission around possible operations to restore order when the situation deteriorates**. The presence of military forces in a theatre results from possible serious disorders. Their legitimacy results from their capability to meet them<sup>1</sup>.

Whatever the visible situation is, a brutal reversibility, without notice, is a standing threat. It is obvious but it needs to be reiterated.

Therefore, during the often protracted periods of crisis outcome, this mission requires proactive attitudes and actions, often in conflict with the principle of maximum safety. Since 2000, KFOR has operated according to the international community's purpose: favoring a progressive return to normal life by supporting confidence-building measures; by having a lower profile and presence; by making the direct action of civilian, international and local agencies easier. Missions and rules given to units, internal and

external communications stressed how important it was to get along this decisively positive approach; and this at the expense of highlighting hazards, which were all the less likely to occur - without excluding them - as a relative

quiet situation seemed to have settled on a long-term basis. A characteristic example is the restoration of the freedom of movement on Mitrovica Bridge under the sole police responsibility in January 2004.



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The MOU<sup>2</sup> signed with the authorities included the brigade's commitment with a 3 hour notice. Fortunately, units reacted very rapidly and they had a much more high adjustment capability, immediately shifting from an open attitude to a harsh intervention attitude - for LO operations - then to a combat configuration almost instantly. In fact, reactivity limitations often resulted from rules that had become essential as time elapsed within another precaution attitude (ammunition storage ...): taken up at a time of crisis outcome.

Without trying to be comprehensive, **a few points about these emergency reactions should be highlighted.**

**It took a long time to reorganize an intelligence system oriented towards middle term operations - of the terrorist kind - in the eyes of the immediate requirements regarding crowd movements.** On urban terrain, only helicopter and drone assets have the flexibility required to evaluate the importance and the variations of these movements.

In the same way as companies were equipped and trained for crowd control, units of all kinds (maneuver, logistics, signal ...) and of all levels (platoon, squad) were in contact with much larger crowds. This crowd behaved like an "unarmed force<sup>3</sup>"; it was commanded, it maneuvered and it cleverly exploited our ROEs' (Rules of Engagement) limits as well as their media status as protestors by using violence in a well-targeted way only. **The tactical requirement of non-entanglement is not easy without a sufficient quantity of non-lethal weapons** to keep crowds away. Without the freedom of action granted by these

assets, the only maneuver margin available could be reduced abruptly and result into non-intervention or fire-opening along with associated risks.

Using crowds as an "unarmed force" and stationing permanently within populations requires **reconsidering the old tactical rule of freedom of movement.** Owing to the small number of axes in the area, a few well-located demonstrations had hindered our reinforcements or our commitments for a pretty long time. On the reverse, the setting-up of a **check-point** network in Kosovo enabled us to compartmentalize and partition the area.

**Keeping contact with all the parties** was vital during the crisis. By being systematically carried out with UNMIK<sup>4</sup> representatives and police officers to show the cohesion and the will of the international community in the Mitrovica area, it aimed at providing openness as regarded forces and police commitments, compelling leaders to face their responsibilities and showing them how risky any further violence could be. Above all, these contacts were nearly the only sources of information about the intentions of both camps, whereas media disinformation was in full gear locally.

**Necessity of co-operation with security forces and LO forces** was obvious.

However, this co-operation was not easy: the ways of thinking and COAs for police forces and armed force were very different from each other. In action, when violence took place, CPs' collocation was extremely useful both to share immediate pieces of information and to carry out operations. When it was quiet, without any common command and control and working methods, and

with a high rotation, both our organizations were easily busy with immediate specific concerns; they did not enable us to carry out regular - though highly desirable - collective training.

Many rioters were identified by our troops during riots. However, it was difficult to bring them before the courts because fielded camera and video assets had been gradually reduced with the handover of responsibility for criminal investigations to the UNMIK police force. Simultaneously and because of the situation of crisis outcome, the UNMIK issued a new penal code in Kosovo, implemented in April 2004; and evidence presentation became very inconvenient. In conclusion, it is obvious that **the post-riot judicial aspect - important for the credibility of forces - requires a painstaking preparation during quiet periods;** we should not be held up by "theoretical" limits of responsibility, because they are also "reversible" between police forces and armed forces.

*1 But it is essential to keep the use of force as low as possible during periods of tension, if only to enable the peacemaking mission to succeed.*

*2 Memorandum of Understanding.*

*3 Apparently at least.*

*4 United Nations Mission in Kosovo.*

Training according to the principle: "He who can do more can do less", the Army showed **its capability to carry out peacemaking missions.** A balance between power and dialogue, an understanding of the state of minds and hearts, a capability to change postures rapidly, are an expertise on which it can rely. However, even if interposition is even-handed, it is not for local players, who have their own objectives and take interposition forces into account to plan their COAs. They observe and learn. They assess our constraints and limits. A crowd, an unarmed troop acting under cover of even extreme media-rigging, is becoming a more and more sophisticated tool that will require more and more elaborate reactions. The similarity between peacemaking and LO cannot lead us to forget the differences pertaining to the operational framework.



## Operation CONCORDIA/ALTAÏR in Macedonia

Operation CONCORDIA, code-named ALTAÏR by the French, started on March 31<sup>st</sup> and ended December 15 2003; the last day 26 contributing nations were OPCON under the force commander (COMFOR).

Before ARTEMIS, CONCORDIA was the European Union's (EUFOR) first military operation under the "Berlin plus" agreements. Initially commanded by the French EMF 1 (*état-major de force* : one of four French Army modular division headquarters), EUFOR took charge of the operation on October 1<sup>st</sup>.

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BY COLONEL PIERRE AUGUSTIN, EUFOR DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS AND THE OPERATION'S REPRESENTATIVE FROM FRANCE

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### EUFOR MISSION AND RESOURCES

On March 18 2003, the European Union Council approved the CONCORDIA OPLAN: EU Military Engagement in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Its specified mission was to **conduct an operation in FYROM** under OHQ (Operation Headquarters) command. **Its purpose was to implement the Ohrid agreements, the overall objective being to stabilize the region as well as the country by implementation of the PESC following the crisis of 2002.** An additional command element (EU) located in Naples would intercede on the headquarter's behalf at AFSOUTH. The center of gravity for CONCORDIA derived its synergy from institutional actors, the international community, and the European military force

**A human and geographic information-collecting network developed this synergy** during the operation.

The human element relied on international organizations concentrated around Skopje, administrative officers of the country, and ethnic communities. Methodical collection of information from each of these actors contributed to efficient and indispensable synergistic politico-military effects.

**Twenty-two Field Liaison Teams (FLT)s** made up the tactical force in the former crisis area (FCA). The FLTs were assigned to one of three multinational sectors (Swedish, Portuguese and French) each with its national commander. **Two heavy platoons** (French and Italian) acted either in pairs as light teams or as a reserve **with responsibility for the entire area of operations**. Their operational value lay in information collection, armed deterrence, and a reputation for impartiality (its legitimacy deriving from the Ohrid international outline agreement that defined the framework of the operation). A Belgian helicopter detachment with 3 armed AGUSTA 109s (liaison and recon), one medevac helicopter, two EOD teams (Italian and Austrian), and multinational health support element (Greek and Italian) supported the force.

## EUFOR ACTION

The conduct of operations in the FCA was clear, but at the same time delicate. Its basis was **some simple tasks** defined in the OPLAN:

- presence patrols and information collection patrols to evaluate the security situation,
- reconnaissance of the road network and other areas (by helicopter, vehicle or dismounted),
- meetings with civilian and military authorities, international organizations, as well as systematic encounters with the population (Civil Advisory groups, town councils, non-political gatherings),
- overwatch of specific events and support to the OSCE and EUMM international observers (incident control or specific missions).

These operations pursued two objectives: **information collection to assess the security situation** in the FCA, and visibility/integration of the European force. Systematic contact with the ethnic communities proved to be an important tool. The EUFOR's liaison teams provided omnipresence. The combination of light

and heavy teams performing missions strongly reinforced a palpable deterrence in addition to establishing the perception of the EUFOR as an integrated force dedicated to restoring public confidence. Building this confidence set the foundation for the information collection effort and proved essential to restoring a peaceful environment lost following the events of 2002.

EUFOR has become a federating security element in the daily life of the ethnic communities. Immersion and openness of these patrols in the FCA has been elemental (daily presence from 0700 until 0100 the following day with one quarter of the teams patrolling at night), particularly compared with other international contributors. This unflagging investment paid great dividends in upholding the policies of the European Union Special Representative while at the same time defusing potential crises.

**A disciplined and quality intelligence collection effort** supported the decision-making process contributing to a gradual improvement of the situation excepting occasional increase in tension. Emphasis on situational awareness, providing intelligence products on a need-to-know basis, effective assessment of non-validated information, and security operations all served to prevent mission creep and the abuse of the military apparatus.

Thus, under the UNPD aegis, EUFOR executed the mission to observe weapons collection (having rejected the "evaluation/control" language), it being solely responsible for the 34 collection points in the FCA. The force carried out mobile patrols and observations at random times with varied schedules while avoiding permanent presence. This flexibility guaranteed the success of the operation.

## KEY LESSONS LEARNED

Subsequent to a crisis, any resumption or consolidation of **peace dynamics requires a global approach**. CONCORDIA thus validated the relevance of

Petersberg missions and inter-allied organization. It demonstrated the efficient multiplying effects derived from modularity and flexibility in a modest size force properly constructed. It also established **the limits of military force in a socio-political environment weakened by manipulation and disinformation**. This society, although willing to reform, suffered from the clash between open economy and Mafia-type trafficking (wood, weapons, women, cigarettes, drugs, and fake goods) leastwise in the FCA. Armed groups, originally the main cause of instability, reorganized themselves into criminal elements linked to illegal trafficking fostered by a varied clientele and the law of supply and demand.

**From the tactical point of view, the deployed resources were well dimensioned for the operation.**

In order to maintain its operational and deterrence capabilities, the force regularly and strictly conducted internal rescue exercises with all the required advertising for the benefit of observers from the international community. To even out differences in qualifications, age, ranks and experience, EUFOR instituted an intensive training program (weekly firing exercises and drill about various rescue scenarios) that increased homogeneity throughout each nation. This training has been a true force multiplier.

However, this first EUFOR **lacked two high value-added capabilities:**

- **a team dedicated to information operations (INFO OPS)** to release the weekly (Master) messages into the area of operations. A multidisciplinary committee (according to the British doctrine Joint Warfare Publication 3-80 June 20021) should write these messages since the FLTs could only devote part of their time to this vital task

- **legal analysis integrated in J2**, e.g. a specialist in legal investigation or in criminal intelligence in order to focus legal scrutiny of the situation.

**As the first European operation, CONCORDIA/ALTAIR earned the approval of the entire international**



# lessons learned

**community. At the end of its nine months it had completely fulfilled the mission for which EUFOR had been constituted.** The two successive headquarters that constituted the cornerstone for the operation encountered complete success, the second one being the EUROFOR.

On December 15 2003, as a consequence of the general situation in FYROM, CONCORDIA ceded its place to PROXIMA, the first European police operation. It had reached the limits of the use of military force within in the framework of the Petersberg missions, inter-allied, and coalition operations.

<sup>1</sup> Editor's note: *The following texts describe the French and NATO doctrines applying to these domains:*

**NATO MC 422 about Information**

**Operations**, encompassing vast domains and not solely limited to PSYOP (cf. AJP-3.7), which can be compared with the French communication locale (1 of the 4 pillars of COMOPS - see below).

**- The joint doctrine for the operational communication EMA/EMP du 02/07/01.**

The General Staff will issue a concept and a joint doctrine about the INFO OPS in March/April 2005.



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# The Growth of VIGIPIRATE in Ile-de-France

*VIGIPIRATE has now become part of the Parisian landscape. As a matter of fact, since the day this plan was implemented in 1996, more than 65,000 Army soldiers have come to Paris for this mission. This represents a lot of experience from which lessons can be learned.*

**COLONEL DOMINIQUE CHRISSEMENT, CHIEF OF STAFF, PARIS JOINT DEFENSE ZONE**

## CHANGING ENGAGEMENTS

Following the attack on the Parisian RER<sup>1</sup> at the Port-Royal station in December 1996, the armed forces have been continuously committed to ensuring the security of Ile de France within the structure of the anti-terrorism plan nicknamed **VIGIPIRATE**.

**In the beginning**, the prevailing principle was simple: patrols consisting of only **one gendarme or one police officer accompanied by two soldiers**.

This enabled the civilian officer to greatly increase his surveillance potential. The system was thus implemented during several years, to the greatest satisfaction of not only the Prefect of Police, who is in charge of Parisian security and who employs the military, but also to its inhabitants who have always given a warm welcome to these soldiers coming from everywhere in France to do their part for the people's security.

### *Many and Diverse Sites*

This arrangement has however **significantly evolved during the years**.

For instance, the location of the VIGIPIRATE patrols changed often. Committed initially to protect RER and local subway stations, soldiers then began to patrol very diverse sites such as:

- symbolic buildings (Arc of Triumph, the Eiffel Tower),



EMIAZDP

- public buildings (OECD, Bercy compound, the central court of law),
- sensitive buildings (diplomatic representatives),
- places of worship (Notre Dame de Paris, Grande Mosque),
- gathering places (Chateau de Versailles, the Louvre, Eurodisney),
- transportation nodes (major airports, railway stations, Issy les Moulineaux heliport),
- awkward locations such as the Seine river itself (patrolled by engineer corps' inflatable boats),
- the parks located close to the Elysées palace.

This large span demonstrates the **civilian authorities' concern for meeting the threat** and summarizes the measures taken in the Paris region during the last few years.

## New Missions

In this case as in many others, **the end of the military draft induced dramatic changes in the way the plan was implemented.** It became clear that passively following gendarmes or police officers would not satisfy professional soldiers. They were, after all, entrusted with surveillance missions on a daily basis during overseas operations without the presence of law enforcement agents.

This led in early 2003 to the Army's implementation of **innovative missions: the "autonomous patrols,"** which conducted rounds on foot or in vehicles without being accompanied by law enforcement representatives. The prime mission of these patrols being to observe the environment, detect any suspicious activity, and report back. They organized in such a way that law enforcement officers were always on duty in the immediate vicinity to **assist very rapidly should it become necessary.**

These provisions completely met the needs of not only the military, who are more autonomous now, but also the police officers and gendarmes, who can more easily dedicate themselves to their specific missions.

These recent changes make it possible to **draw beneficial lessons for the military as well as for the relations between military and civilian authorities.**

## OPERATIONAL COMMITMENT

The central idea behind this development was to replicate as much as possible the rules of engagement prevailing during actual overseas missions.

### Tactical Employment

The advent of autonomous patrols resulted in more responsibility at all levels of the hierarchy: today, it is the EMT<sup>2</sup> commander who assigns units to the patrolled sites, the company commander who sets the conditions for his unit, and the squad leader who is actually in charge of his mission. All these provisions didn't exist initially; they were made possible by the newly professional force.

Decentralization requires:

- detailed mission preparation based on clearly defined rules of engagement and behavior,
- preliminary reconnaissance by the EMT and company commanders,
- precise orders easily understood by soldiers (i.e. written in mission terms similar to those in actual overseas operations).

In addition, these autonomous missions require good radio contact with police forces. This was achieved when soldiers were equipped with police radio sets. These provisions demonstrate how much the Prefecture of Police trusts the military. Radios serve to ensure overall security and are an indispensable condition for the conduct of autonomous patrols.

This experiment demonstrates how much **interest these missions cause** as well as the Army personnel's motivation to accomplish them. However there is a risk of complaisance. A soldier's tour has been limited to two weeks for this reason. In addition, EMT commanders are allowed to rotate their units from site to site in order to prevent monotony.

### Command and Control

Since the implementation of VIGIPIRATE, units regularly rotate every other week. It was therefore important to define **clear and precise command and control measures.** So the Paris Joint Zone of Defense HQ developed a standing document: a widely distributed operation order supplemented for each troop rotation by a fragmentary order and on-site reconnaissance. Each EMT or company commander is thus able to study the VIGIPIRATE OPORDER at his home station and train his troops even before completing his reconnaissance. A two-day reconnaissance enables him to contact his future military and civilian associates and to assess the locations where troops will be deployed.

Another lesson learned: **the necessity of communications,** seemingly an obvious requirement, but not necessarily easy to achieve. Indeed, the current military system leans primarily on telephone communications up to the platoon leader's level. Some recent events, however, (AZF<sup>3</sup>, attacks in Madrid, France Telecom<sup>4</sup> breakdown) show the fragility of this system, particularly in the event of a crisis. It led, on certain occasions, to the deployment of a tactical network using organic radio sets while waiting for the fielding of an autonomous military communications network with Motorola equipment.

Lastly, recent events demonstrate the need for deploying an additional level of command and control when the number of PROTERRE units is over 15. Such was the case at the time of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Operation OVERLORD necessitating the deployment of 24 company size units in the Ile de France region and requiring the deployment of a brigade HQ, manned by the 11<sup>th</sup> Airborne Brigade and collocated with the COIAZDP<sup>5</sup>, at the Camp des Loges HQ.

### Growing Civilian-Military Relationships

The **eight years of continuous VIGIPIRATE action** brought a reciprocal appreciation between the military and civilians, which must be stressed also.



## Mutual Understanding

A **considerable increase in civilian-military cooperation** resulted from:

- daily contact between military and law enforcement personnel,
- personal engagement by the military hierarchy at each level in order to be better known and accepted by civilian counterparts,
- constant willingness to respond to civilian authorities' requests.

Today, thanks to the continuous effort of both parties, this cooperation has reached an excellent level that is beneficial to both. This reciprocal trust is clearly demonstrated when the issue is raised about a potential decrease of the number of committed soldiers: civilian authorities, well aware of the constraints imposed on the armed forces and confident in their capacity to go back up to previous levels quickly, demonstrate no

hesitation at letting VIGIPIRATE dedicated manpower drop for a given period of time. Conversely, the OGZDP<sup>6</sup> seeks to satisfy the Prefect of the Zone when he insists on obtaining an increase of deployed military personnel. Lastly, civilian authorities no longer express their requirements in terms of numbers of troops on a specific site, but rather in terms of effects; terminology familiar to soldiers, but usually not to civilian authorities.

## Working at All Levels

This collaboration can be found at all levels: the joint staff deals with the Prefecture's department heads, EMT commanders deal with the persons in charge of security for each of the relevant sites, company commanders attend the police daily update briefings and the platoon leaders are present when police officers begin a patrol mission. It can even

reach a point where they all go to the shooting range together.

Even the soldiers do not miss an opportunity to interact with police officers they may meet during their missions, be it during the patrols or during breaks at district police stations. As years went by, links were established, little by little, with mutual understanding and positive appreciation growing up between both parties enabling a **synergy that serves as a multiplier of both parties' efficiency and reactivity**.

1 Parisian regional subway.

2 Tactical HQ.

3 Explosion in a chemical factory in Toulouse.

4 Major telephone service provider.

5 Joint Operational Centre of the Paris Zone of Defense.

6 General officer in charge of the Paris Zone of Defense.



**VIGIPIRATE constitutes an exceptional opportunity for developing reciprocal understanding between the civilian and military worlds.** It is also a demonstration of our armed forces' professionalism. Based on the principle that OPINT (Internal Operations) should be equivalent to OPEX (External Operations), it has become obvious that our units demonstrated the highest degree of availability, adaptability and reactivity, which are among the most important military qualities. Recurring requests for military participation in this mission is an incontestable proof of success.



## Civil Defense Military Units

### The Vimy, Toulouse, and Evian Operations

**Civil defense military units (FORMISC<sup>1</sup>), Army engineers units, are detached to the Ministry of Interior - Civil Defense and Security Directorate - for employment. This Ministry is in charge of financing their pay and allowances, infrastructure, equipment, clothing, ordinary expenditures, training, and operations.**

*They are under command of a general officer, military assistant to the prefect director of the civil defense and security. They are on a **permanent alert status to intervene in any natural or technological disaster, in peacetime, during crises, or in wartime in France as well as abroad.***

*On the French territory, urgency requiring, they are committed to back up firemen and sometimes to directly support police forces. They keep autonomous detachments on call, on a 3 hours alert state. They could be sent abroad on request for aid from a country struck by some disaster.*

*Manned with 1500 highly qualified rescuers, they get exceptional and specialized equipment adapted to their various fields of intervention. They carry out many training courses to the benefit of the Armed Forces and of firemen, in France as well as abroad. They participate in manning the interdepartmental crisis management operation center (COGIC) and the defense district operational centers of the metropolitan and overseas territory.*

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#### VIMY : THE UIISC (CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING AND INTERVENTION UNITS) INVOLVED IN POPULATION AID AND IN ORDNANCE CLEARING SUPPORT

On Thursday, April 12 2001, the commanding officer of the civil defense training and intervention unit #7 (UIISC 7) of Brignoles was requested to take command of the FORMISC detachment that was at Pas-de-Calais prefectorial disposal for removing WWI ordnance.

The missions given to the UIISC 1 and UIISC 7 detachments, manned by engineer-rescuers, were as follows:

- To organize and to monitor, in conjunction with the local fire department, the evacuation of the population for the day.
- To position preventive rescue means for ordnance clearance experts.

- To provide support to the gathering centers for evacuees.
- To handle the populations return after the ordnance removal.

To meet the needs as listed by the prefectorial crisis cell, the civil defense military units detachment was associated with the various participants in the operation: law and order forces, local firemen, city council services, staff of the emergency housing centers, mine clearance experts. It also established autonomous structures (decontamination medical module and advanced dressing station).

The FORMISC detachment commanding officer always is subordinate to the chief of the rescue operation he makes proposals to fulfill specific tasks as a supplement to the action of other actors

in the operation or in an autonomous way. **This is a typical mission as national reinforcement.**

#### TOULOUSE: THE UIISC AT THE HEART OF THE ACTION

On Friday, September 21 2001, at 10.20 am, an enormous explosion occurred inside the AZF plant. The disaster airmobile intervention detachment of the UIISC 7 and the technological company of the UIISC 1 were immediately activated. The first elements reached Toulouse by 20.00, to be followed at 23.00 by the rest of the detachment. The men were committed in rescue operations straight away. The chief of the rescue operations handled the coordination measures.



Because of the extent of damages, they first looked for the people that could be buried within the plant and in the surroundings. Progression was slow and risky because of intermingled profiles and of blocks of concrete. In addition the work of search-dog teams was hampered by a strong ammonia smell.

Before they are committed there is always a reconnaissance of the place by the technological detachment to detect any possible toxic leakage.

After three days, the search was suspended, the teams are then engaged in aid of the population to restore the stricken housing. During one week they covered more than 130 rooftops with tarpaulin, isolating more than 800 windows and openings and clearing away 800 m<sup>3</sup> of ruins.

The distribution of the action areas was then decided in conjunction with the Toulouse city council.

At the time of this operation, a support mission for crisis situation coming from the Civil Defense and Security Directorate went to reinforce the local operation center of the prefecture. The FORMISC officers of that support mission for crisis situation are most

often assigned to the “population protection” cell. That mission, beyond the national reinforcement, called for FORMISC officers to assist the chief of the rescue operation, at that time the local prefect.

#### EVIAN : A THIRD TYPE OF ORGANIZATION

For the G8 summit in Evian, June 1, 2, and 3 2003, the FORMISC have participated in the rescue system by establishing **preventive NRBC dispositions**.

As the summit had been scheduled well in advance, the dispositions could be organized outside the usual national reinforcement framework. In fact the national reinforcement had been established before the event.

For the same reason, the responsibility of the rescue operation functional commander in NRBC matters had been entrusted to the FORMISC detachment commander, because of the well-recognized capability of the FORMISC and because of their equipment. This functional sector was grouped together the NRBC detachments provided by the local fire station, the Armed Forces and by the FORMISC.

Those **three examples of intervention** demonstrate three different types of organization for inserting the civil defense military formations (FORMISC) into a rescue operation.

**The standard pattern (Vimy and Toulouse) is the one that is always used in case of urgency.** It could however be replaced by another organization when protection is about scheduled events and when that leaves some time to consider the best use of capabilities.

<sup>1</sup> FORMISC stands for: “FORMations Militaires de la Sécurité Civile”.

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of Interior, of Homeland security and of local liberties - Civil defense and security Directorate.

## The Command Organization of the “Normandy Landings 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary” Operation

(May 20 – June 7 2004)

The Army is regularly involved in homeland operations, either to protect the domestic population, in case of some natural disaster, to fight terrorism, or to carry out homeland security during major events. For the last few years Armed Forces resources, and more particularly Army ones, have been steadily involved in these kinds of operations. “VIGIPIRATE”<sup>2</sup>, a plan that is familiar to the French people, is a good example of this involvement. As a matter of fact this homeland operation (OPINT<sup>3</sup>) is given much publicity in the media, it has been going on since the waves of terrorist attacks in the 80s.

The latest homeland operation carried out by the French Armed Forces, took place in June 2003 at the time of the Normandy Landings 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary. At that time the French Army had been tasked with planning and carrying out, in close cooperation with all State agencies, the land operations necessary to secure the whole set of the planned events.

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
The “Normandy Landings 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary” operation is original because of:

- the participation of all State agencies,
- a necessary coordination and liaison at every level,
- the mission given to the Army which resources were to reinforce those of the Gendarmerie, while retaining its own independence and freedom of action.

Those main characteristics made it necessary to set up a specific command system, organized on three levels, that stresses the liaison need between the various components in order to get a good information flow and utmost coordination.

### AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION

The first and main feature of this operation is the participation of all the major State agencies: the three Services, the national Gendarmerie, the various police services, civil support assets, etc. The whole operation had been placed under command of the regional prefect (Région de Basse Normandie et du Calvados), responsible to the government authorities for the smooth running of the commemoration events. Because there were so many actors it has been necessary to clearly define the roles



and responsibilities of each one, and to set up command structures and assets proper to enable the “inter-services chief” to use and coordinate all these assets. To do so the regional prefect used a general command post (GCP) located in CAEN. This GCP was the decision and coordination body for all actions related to the 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary. It was composed of representatives from all State Agencies, among which were the operational controllers of the three Services and of the

Gendarmerie. These operational controllers assumed command of the deployed forces; they were the first level of the command system.

They were military advisers to the prefect for the use of the forces they assumed command of, they also had a staff structure available to act as a liaison and to command and control the deployed forces, as it remains a military commander prerogative.



## THE MILITARY COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION

### The land structure

This structure included the participation in land operations security on one hand, and on the other hand the various commemorative ceremonies. In that matter, the armed forces' role was to provide a number of units and to transport them. Organizing and running the ceremonies was the responsibility of prefectorial authorities. The land security disposition included elements from each one of the three Services and was under command of the land operation controller. It is worth noting that this officer was also the joint services controller and consequently the one directly dealing with the regional prefect for defense matters.

He had available to him the second and third levels of the command and control system:

- one Joint Coordination Cell (CCIA –Cellule de Coordination InterArmées) located in the same place as the GCP (general command post) and manned with personnel from the North-West Army District (RTNO<sup>4</sup>), from the Joint HQ of the Rennes land territorial defense district, from the Nantes Force HQ # 2 (EMF2), and from Navy and Air Force liaison detachments. In addition to its coordinating role this cell was in charge of monitoring the ceremonies, of joint health care and of NRBC supervision, as well as of a direct liaison to the Army district HQ and to the CPCO (Planning and Conduct of Operations Center).

- One PCTIA (land forces HQ fitted to a joint environment), manned by the Force HQ # 2, augmented with personnel from the North-West Army District, responsible for the land security disposition, the transportation of those forces involved in the ceremonies, and the logistical support to be provided to the three Services. It also included liaison detachments from the other two Services and from the Gendarmerie. This CP was taking its orders from the land operational controller and directly controlled both tactical HQs in the field and one joint helicopter battalion.

That structure made it possible to maintain a single chain of command. The PROTERRE (Homeland Protection) companies were

issued orders by the tactical HQs. Those last ones being tasked by the PCTIA (land forces HQ fitted to a joint environment). However the companies had no subordination link to the prefectorial authority. Any request from that authority had to go through the Joint Coordination Cell (CCIA) and through the land operation controller

### The air structure

Inside the GCP (general command post), the air operation controller had a C2A2 (Air activities coordination center) available in charge with coordinating all air activities in the area of the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary. The air structure was made up of three components:

- one air operation base (BIMOA), manned by the Air Force, but under control of the land operation controller in charge with the land security disposition,
- one joint helicopter battalion, equipped with aircraft from the three Services, under command of an Army Aviation officer, it was an integral part of the land security disposition,
- some resources under Air Force control (armed helicopters, reconnaissance and combat aircraft) to fulfill its air security mission.

### The naval structure

The Navy operational controller was represented inside the GCP and he had his naval CP in Port-en-Bessin to carry out all operations related to the maritime area surveillance.

## RELATIONSHIP AND COORDINATION WITH LAW AND ORDER FORCES

One other feature of the operation was the interlocking of the Army disposition inside the Gendarmerie and police areas of responsibility.

During the planning phase of the event each one's responsibility had been defined, steps had been taken to ensure independence of the tactical HQs and to avoid a duplicate subordination of the tactical HQs simultaneously to the PCTIA and to the police or to the Gendarmerie.

To do so, orders accurately defined:

- the missions and zones of action for each unit,
- the ROEs and attitude,
- the coordination measures by sworn

police officers assigned down to the lowest level. This step has been seen as a must for any future operation of that nature.

Any new request not planned in the operation orders had to pass through the CCIA and/or the PCTIA, the only bodies authorized to make decisions.

## Organization of the Communication System

Command and control of the joint CIS was the responsibility of the Air Force. In this context it had to provide for the equipment of the military cells located in the GCP.

The CIS assets committed by the Army were as follows:

- phone, encoded or not, telegraphy, Internet and Intranet;
- forces Command and Information System (SICF) between the CCIA/GCP, the PCTIA and the tactical HQs;
- PR4G5 radio sets that have been used as a basic net within the tactical HQs and between the PROTERRE companies;
- Integrated Automatic Signals Network (RITA 2G) used as the backbone of the basic communication architecture.

**In conclusion**, the command and control organization implemented during the "Normandy Landings 60<sup>th</sup> Anniversary" operation made it possible to keep a single command and control system, while achieving coordination at every level by setting up detailed procedures and liaison detachments all along the chain of command. It has been the source of:

- quick return of information,
- great reaction capacity facing any new situation,
- field coordination added to some freedom of action, while sticking to the general framework as clearly defined by orders.

*1 Translator's note: Force HQ # 2.*

*2 Translator's note: Homeland Security Plan.*

*3 Translator's note: OPINT stands for "OPération INTérieure" – Homeland Operation.*

*4 Translator's note: RTNO stands for Région Terre Nord-Ouest.*

*5 Translator's note: Postes Radio de 4<sup>e</sup> Génération –4<sup>th</sup> generation radio sets.*

# ( Land Forces Contribution to Public Security/Law and Order During External and Internal Operations in the Pictures )



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# DOCTRINE

